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Abstract
Teachers have an important impact on students in the short- and long-term, but only
teachers’ experience consistently predicts high teacher quality. This dissertation, divided into
three chapters, investigates two topics that are related to teachers’ experience levels: turnover
and retirement.
The first chapter studies the relationship between voluntary beginning teacher turnover
and teachers’ levels of conscientiousness. It uses the data from the Beginning Teacher
Longitudinal Study and the effort that teachers put on a survey taken during their first year in the
profession as a proxy for teachers’ levels of conscientiousness. The results of this chapter
indicate that teachers putting less effort on their surveys (i.e. the less conscientious teachers) are
more likely to be retained. While higher quality principals can reduce the likelihood of teacher
turnover, these principals more effective at retaining less conscientious teachers.
The second chapter conceptually evaluates policies that try to induce teacher turnover in
an attempt to reduce mounting pension costs. Using data from Massachusetts, this chapter
calculates the required deviations from actuarially assumed teacher exit rates that would hold the
uniform normal cost rate (the average cost of prefunding all currently accruing benefits for
teachers as a percent of salary) constant when the lowering the discount rate from the expected
investment return rate to a less risky rate. It finds that the probability that each teacher exits
would have to increase substantially. This chapter also evaluates two targeted policies that would
only increase teacher exit rates among the teachers that earn individual normal cost rates above
the uniform normal cost rate and among the teachers that are eligible to retire. Even when all
teachers in the targeted populations exit the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System, savings
to the fund are not enough to prevent a rise in the uniform normal cost rate.

The final chapter of this dissertation calculates teachers’ willingness-to-pay for several
job conditions using a nationally representative sample of teachers from RAND’s American
Teacher Panel. Results indicate that respondents value their final average salary defined benefit
plans at under 3 percent of salary relative to switching to an alternative retirement plan, but
experience and cognitive ability, used to proxy for teacher quality, mediate this preference.
Early-career and lower quality teachers, measuring through lower levels of cognitive ability, are
indifferent to the type of retirement plan they are enrolled in. Respondents also valued their
retirement plans less than they valued their replacement rates, retirement ages, salary growth,
health insurance, and whether they are enrolled in Social Security.
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Introduction
Perhaps the most foundational insight from education research is the basic notion that
high quality instruction matters. Teachers can impact students in at least three important ways.
First, teachers have large impacts on student achievement (Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al.,
2005; Rockoff, 2004). The average effect of a one standard deviation improvement in teacher
quality is estimated to be 0.13 standard deviations in reading achievement and 0.17 standard
deviations in math achievement (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010). Second, teachers influence
students’ social-emotional skills, effort in class, and behavior (Jackson, 2018; Kraft, 2017).
Third, teachers have meaningful effects on students in the long-run, affecting students’ earnings,
college quality, neighborhood quality, the likelihood that students save for retirement, and
lowering teen birth rates (Chetty et al., 2014).
Given the important roles that teachers play in the lives of their students, it becomes
important to understand what predicts high-quality teaching. Unfortunately, teachers’ experience
is the only consistent predictor of teacher quality (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Harris & Sass, 2011;
Papay & Kraft, 2015; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Wiswall, 2013). Teachers improve in
quality as they gain experience. While there have been other promising conceivable predictors,
they typically do not bear fruit. For example, teachers that enter the profession through the Teach
for America have larger positive effects on student achievement traditionally certified teachers,
but only in certain grades and subjects while there is more variation within the set of Teach for
America teachers and traditionally certified teachers than there is across pathways to these
profession (Henry et al., 2014).
The assumption that experience is the most important predictor of high-quality teaching
means that a vital goal for policymakers is retaining teachers. However, many potentially
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impactful educators exit the profession long before they reach their potential. Ten percent of
teachers will exit the classroom after their first year and 17 percent will not survive 5 years as
teachers in their initial schools (Gray & Taie, 2015). This teacher turnover poses significant
problems for students, schools, and districts. Teacher turnover has significant negative effects on
student achievement (Ronfeldt et al., 2013) and forces schools to engage in costly searches for
replacement teachers (Barnes et al., 2007; Birkeland & Curtis, 2006; Milanowski & Odden,
2007) who are often rookie teachers of low-quality.
The first chapter of this dissertation digs deeper into the teacher turnover question. Prior
research has documented that the teachers that make contributions to students’ test scores are less
likely to leave the profession (Boyd et al., 2007; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2005;
Henry et al., 2011; Krieg, 2006), but has yet to consider non-cognitive quality of retained
teachers. Growing evidence suggests that teachers affect the non-cognitive skills of students and
that the teachers that impact non-cognitive skills are not the same teachers that impact test scores
(Cheng & Zamarro, 2018; Jackson, 2018; Papay & Kraft, 2015). This chapter uses teachers’ item
non-response rates on a survey to proxy for conscientiousness. Item non-response is the number
of questions on a survey that respondents leave blank divided by the number of questions
respondents were supposed to answer. Several recent studies demonstrate the potential of item
non-response as a proxy for conscientiousness (Soland et al., 2019 reviews these studies). Using
data from the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study, this chapter investigates the relationship
between conscientiousness and voluntary beginning teacher turnover. Results indicate that
teachers exerting less effort on their surveys (i.e. less conscientious teachers) are more likely to
be retained. Furthermore, even though principals that are higher quality based on teachers’
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evaluations of principals appear to be more effective at retaining teachers, these high-quality
principals are more effective at retaining the less conscientious teachers.
A common proposal to improve teacher retention is to increase teacher pay since teachers
earning higher salaries are more likely to remain in the profession (Borman & Dowling, 2008;
Imazeki, 2005). The problem with increasing salaries is that there is not as much money
available in state and district budgets to spend on raises since costs associated with teacher
pension have risen substantially since 2004 (Costrell, 2019; Kim et al., 2020; McGee, 2016).
Pension expenditures have ballooned to combat the $600 billion in unfunded accrued liabilities
(McGee, 2019; Novy‐Marx & Rauh, 2011). However, that figure may actually understate the
underfunding problem in public pensions.
Actuarial assumptions, which may be incorrect, shape the fiscal health of teacher
pensions. Typically, retirement funds discount teachers’ future benefits at the expected
investment return rate, but the true rate of return is usually lower. When the actual rate falls short
of the expected rate, unfunded accrued liabilities rise (Costrell, 2018). When the discount rate
decreases, the cost to prefund all currently accruing benefits, the normal cost, rises (Costrell,
2020). The second chapter of this dissertation conceptually evaluates one policy proposal that
attempts to reduce pension costs. Chicago, Kansas, and California have had or currently have
voluntary retirement incentive programs, which induce teacher turnover to rein in pension costs.
This chapter describes a methodology that would change actuarially assumed teacher exit rates,
thereby inducing teacher turnover, all while holding normal costs constant when lowering the
discount rate. In Massachusetts, an assumed 7.5 percent discount rate corresponds with a uniform
normal cost rate, the normal cost as a percent of salary, of nearly 12 percent. Teachers’ turnover
probabilities would have to increase drastically for all teachers in order to hold the uniform
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normal cost rate constant at close to 12 percent when the discount rate is allowed to decline. This
chapter models two policies that would target teacher turnover among the set of teachers whose
individual normal cost rates exceed the uniform normal cost rate and teachers who are eligible to
retire. The latter targeted policy mirrors voluntary retirement incentive programs in Chicago,
Kansas, and California. When the discount rate is cut to 6 percent or lower, all teacher that earns
a normal cost rate above the uniform normal cost rate and all teachers that are eligible to retire
would be forced to exit teaching is Massachusetts public schools. Even when all of these teacher
exit, the cumulative savings to the retirement system fail to hold the uniform normal cost rate
constant at 12 percent. This means either that the state would have to raise contributions to the
retirement system or that unfunded accrued liabilities would rise.
Teachers in many states, including Massachusetts, enroll in the state’s Final Average
Salary Defined Benefit (FAS DB) retirement plan. Some have argued that these plans serve as
teacher recruitment and retention tools (Boivie, 2011, 2017), but there are serious drawbacks to
these plans including that these plans are highly susceptible underfunding (Aldeman & Johnson,
2015; Backes et al., 2016; Costrell & Podgursky, 2009). Alternative retirement plans, such as
Defined Contribution (DC) and Cash Balance (CB) plans, can be cost equivalent to states, given
key plan assumptions, and generate comparable benefits while reducing government cost
uncertainty (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009; McGee & Winters, 2018).
The third chapter of this dissertation investigates teachers’ preferences for retirement
plans and other components of their compensation. Using a discrete choice stated preferences
experiment embedded in a 15-minute survey for a nationally representative sample of teachers,
this chapter calculates teachers’ willingness-to-pay for retirement plans, replacement rates
(annual retirement benefits as a percent of salary), retirement ages, salary growth, class sizes,
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health insurance, and Social Security. Respondents to this survey associate switching from FAS
DB plans to DC and CB plans with a 2.8 and 2.6 percent salary decrease, respectively. Earlycareer teachers are indifferent between FAS DB plans and alternative plans, while late-career
teachers value switching out of FAS DB plans at a 6.5 percent salary cut. Teachers with high
levels of cognitive ability, a proxy measure for teacher quality that is associated with student
achievement (Hanushek et al., 2018), would have to be compensated with a 5.2 percent raise to
switch from an FAS DB plan to a DC plan but would only require 4.4 percent raises to switch to
CB plans. Respondents with low levels of cognitive ability have no preferences among
retirement plan types. However, teachers’ willingness-to-pay for retirement plans is lower than
their willingness-to-pay for job conditions. Teachers value a 2-percentage point increase in their
replacement rates, a one-year decrease in the retirement age, or a half percentage point increase
in annual salary growth rates equivalently to their willingness-to-pay to keep their FAS DB
plans.
The evidence in the three chapters of this dissertation significantly advances knowledge
of the determinants of teacher turnover and teacher retirement. Chapter 1 shows that retained
teachers are not always the highest quality teachers as the retained teachers appear to be less
conscientious. Policymakers need to do more to retain conscientious teachers and may task
school principals to do more to keep these teachers in their schools. Results from this chapter
indicate that high-quality principals are actually less effective at retaining conscientious teachers
and that high-quality principals may need to rethink their strategies for retaining high-quality
teachers.
Chapter 2 serves as a warning to policymakers that programs designed to induce teacher
turnover to relieve teacher pensions are unlikely to be successful. Policies that can generate
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enough turnover to hold pension costs at current levels when lowering the discount rate are
unlikely to be feasible as they would require substantial increases in teacher turnover. Targeted
policies fail to hold pension costs constant and would either need to accompany increased
contributions to pension systems or unfunded liabilities would have to rise. Policies that would
seek to create teacher turnover are misguided since they also ignore that the only consistent
predictor of teacher quality is experience. Voluntary retirement incentive programs may sacrifice
student learning in a cost-cutting effort.
The final chapter builds on prior literature which shows that alternative retirement plans
may be less fiscally distressing than traditional FAS DB plans. The results show that pension
reform may be possible, but only if teachers receive something in return. Teachers are willing to
pay to keep their FAS DB plans, but the value they place on these plans is not substantial. The
potential savings to retirement systems from giving teachers raises as compensation for
switching to alternative plans would likely dwarf the salary increases. When states reform their
pension plans, new retirement plans are usually only available to newly hired teachers, but the
results from this chapter suggest that states may be able to switch current teachers into
alternative plans. Late-career teachers who have already accrued substantial benefits had a
significantly higher willingness-to-pay than early- and mid-career teachers. States may opt to
leave their highly experienced teachers in FAS DB plans and give out modest raises to early- and
mid-career teachers to convert a large proportion of their teacher populations into DC or CB
plans.
The three chapters of this dissertation contributes to the education research community by
giving it a better understanding of why high-quality teachers might leave the profession and what
policymakers could consider trying to retain them.
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Chapter 1: Conscientiousness, Principals’ Leadership, and Beginning Teacher Turnover1
Introduction
Voluntary teacher turnover is concerning for schools and students. Costly searches to
replace teachers are a drain on school resources 2 (Barnes et al., 2007; Birkeland & Curtis, 2006;
Milanowski & Odden, 2007) and teacher turnover negatively affects students’ achievement on
standardized tests (Ronfeldt et al., 2013). The effect of teacher turnover compounds when
considering that replacement teachers appear to be, on average, less effective than exiting
teachers (Harris & Sass, 2011; Papay & Kraft, 2015; Rockoff, 2004).
In response to the policy concerns that teacher turnover poses, there exists ample
academic literature documenting the important role of principal quality (Boyd et al., 2011;
Grissom, 2011; Kraft et al., 2016; Ladd, 2011) and teacher and student body characteristics
(Allensworth et al., 2009; Borman & Dowling, 2008; Boyd et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2012;
Kraft et al., 2016; Ladd, 2011; Loeb et al., 2005; Marinell & Coca, 2013) on teacher turnover
decisions. However, this teacher turnover literature has yet to consider in depth the non-cognitive
characteristics of teachers who might be retained.
Teachers make an impact on a wide variety of student outcomes. The teacher quality
literature has long known about the important role that teachers can have on students’ test scores
(Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004), but teachers can also affect students’ social-emotional
skills, effort in class, and behavior (Jackson, 2018; Kraft, 2017). However, those teachers who
are effective at increasing students’ test scores are not necessarily the same as those who are
effective at supporting student socio-emotional outcomes (Kraft, 2017). Teachers’ personality

This paper was coauthored with Gema Zamarro.
These costs on school resources are those associated with separation, recruiting, hiring, and training new teachers.
Milanowski and Odden (2007) show the only large benefit of teacher turnover would be in net replacement pay,
since new teachers are lower on the salary schedule than exiting teachers, but other costs dwarf these gains.
1
2
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skills related to conscientiousness appear to be important determinants of teacher quality not well
measured by teachers’ contributions to their students’ test scores (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018). Due
to the influences that teachers can have on students beyond test score gains, principals and
policymakers should be concerned with the quality of the teaching workforce on a variety of
measures. This deference to teachers’ non-cognitive skills raises the question of which teachers
are more likely to be retained.
In this paper, we study the relationship between teacher turnover and teachers’ levels of
conscientiousness. Specifically, we follow a developing literature that proposes that individuals’
effort on surveys can capture meaningful non-cognitive skills related to conscientiousness
(Hedengren & Stratmann, 2012; Hitt et al., 2016), that is diligence and desire to do a task well.
To our knowledge, only three other studies have looked at the role of conscientiousness in
teacher turnover decisions finding either null effects (Rockoff et al., 2010) or finding that
conscientious teachers have lower teacher turnover rates (Bastian et al., 2017; Robertson-Kraft &
Duckworth, 2014). However, none of this previous work on conscientiousness and teacher
turnover uses a national sample of teachers.
While this paper’s focus is on the effects of conscientiousness on voluntary beginning
teacher turnover, our data were collected during a time of economic instability: the Great
Recession. We are wary that the Great Recession may impact teacher turnover 3. Teachers
demonstrating higher levels of conscientiousness may be less likely than non-conscientious
teachers test their local labor markets during recessions. In order to take Great Recession induced
economic instability into account, we merge the national Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study

There is a pre-existing link between teacher turnover and recessions in the literature already. In Florida, teachers
with higher contributions to their students’ test scores (i.e. higher value-added teachers) were more likely to be hired
during recessions but were also more likely to leave the profession years after (Nagler et al., 2015).
3
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(BTLS) dataset with unemployment data from the USC Great Recession Indicators Database
(GRID) to control for differences in local labor markets and study differential effects depending
on the local economic conditions.
Our results indicate that teachers with lower levels of conscientiousness, i.e. lower levels
of effort on the baseline BTLS survey, present lower probabilities of teacher turnover and are
less likely to switch schools during their first years of teaching. We also find that, as with prior
literature, higher quality principals help retain teachers in their current schools. However, they
seem to be more effective at retaining those teachers who show lower levels of conscientiousness
on their baseline surveys than those who exert more effort. Highly conscientious teachers (i.e.
teachers with higher levels of effort on the baseline survey) appear to be better retained when
there are unstable local labor market conditions.
These results have important policy implications. To the extent that teacher survey effort
captures meaningful dimensions of teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018), our results suggest
that we need better strategies to retain highly conscientious teachers in the profession. While
principals are generally effective at improving teacher retention (Boyd et al., 2011; Grissom,
2011; Kraft et al., 2016; Ladd, 2011), they appear less effective at retaining those who show
higher levels of conscientiousness by putting forward more effort on the baseline survey.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background
concerning teacher turnover and teacher conscientiousness. In the following section, we describe
the data and specific measures that are part of our analysis. The next section describes our
empirical approach to study the determinants of beginning teacher turnover. Next, we present the
results of our analysis. The following section includes 2 sets of robustness checks: altering the
information included in our measure of principal quality and controlling for teachers’ reported
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job satisfaction. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the results and policy
implications.
Background
A 2015 National Center for Education Statistics report pegs the annual rate of teacher
turnover after the first year of a teacher’s career at 10 percent and 17 percent within the first five
years (Gray & Taie, 2015). A considerable literature has aimed to shed light on which factors
determine teacher turnover (see, e.g., Borman & Dowling, 2008; Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley,
2006). Several teacher characteristics are found to predict teacher turnover including
demographic characteristics and type of certification (Boyd et al., 2006; Kane et al., 2008).
Student body characteristics also factor into teacher turnover decisions (Allensworth et al., 2009;
Borman & Dowling, 2008; Boyd et al., 2011; Ladd, 2011; Loeb et al., 2005). Overall,
organizational factors such as school leadership, school safety and discipline, academic
expectations for students, teachers’ collaboration and support with each other appear to be
stronger predictors of teacher turnover than teacher’s demographics, preparation, or average
characteristics of students in the school (Allensworth et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2011; Johnson et
al., 2012; Kraft et al., 2016; Ladd, 2011; Loeb et al., 2005; Marinell & Coca, 2013).
Researchers have also looked at how teacher quality, measured using teachers’
contributions to test scores through value-added models, relates to teacher turnover. High-quality
teachers, on average, were found to be less likely to leave the teaching profession in Washington
State (Krieg, 2006); Texas (Hanushek et al., 2005); New York City (Boyd et al., 2007); and
North Carolina (Goldhaber et al., 2007). On average, teachers in Florida with high value-added
tend to change schools less often, but teachers at the high and low ends of the quality distribution
tend to leave the profession more (Feng & Sass, 2017). To our knowledge, only one study
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includes data from the Great Recession, finding that the beginning teachers in the first 5 years of
their careers who left the classroom in North Carolina during this time were less effective on
average (Henry et al., 2011). Furthermore, when high-quality teachers exit the profession, they
earn more in other fields (Chingos & West, 2011).
A consistent finding in the literature is that principals’ effectiveness and leadership
reduce the likelihood of teacher turnover (Boyd et al., 2011; Grissom, 2011; Kraft et al., 2016;
Ladd, 2011). In this respect, Grissom and Bartanen (2018) specifically connect principal quality
to retaining high-quality teachers relative to low-quality teachers, or “strategic teacher retention.”
Whereas previous work relied solely on teacher survey responses to measure principal quality,
the authors combined these teacher surveys with principal evaluations that district leaders in
Tennessee conducted for their analysis; the authors use classroom observations of teachers that
principals often perform as well as student achievement and growth to measure teacher quality.
They corroborate the previous finding that high-quality principals can reduce the probability of
teacher turnover. The authors also find that effective principals seem to be better at retaining
high-quality teachers based on classroom observations, but not based on student growth or
achievement.
Teacher Conscientiousness and Turnover
In general, individuals’ level of conscientiousness appear to be an important determinant
of job performance, retention, and job satisfaction (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick &
Zimmerman, 2009; Dalal, 2005; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Roberts et al., 2007). Importantly,
among teachers, self-reported higher conscientiousness corresponds with lower levels of burnout
and higher morale, which may affect turnover decisions (Kokkinos, 2007; Teven, 2007).
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Only 3 prior studies have looked at the relationship between teacher conscientiousness
and teacher turnover. Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, and Staiger (2010) find that, among beginning
teachers in New York City in the 2006-07 school year, self-reported conscientiousness does not
predict teacher turnover the following year. In contrast, Robertson-Kraft and Duckworth (2014)
use a convenience sample of Teach for America beginning teachers from low-income districts
and find that teachers with higher levels of self-reported grit, a non-cognitive skill associated
with conscientiousness, are more likely to be retained throughout the first year than their less
gritty counterparts.4 Similarly, Bastian et al. (2017) uses a sample of first year teachers in the
2013-14 academic year in North Carolina to study the effect of personality traits on teacher
retention. The authors find that more self-reported conscientious teachers have lower rates of
attrition. Additionally, a meta-analysis finds that teacher self-reported conscientiousness is
negatively related to burnout, which is likely to be associated with turnover (Kim et al., 2019).
In this paper, we use measures of survey effort through teachers’ item non-response rates
on their baseline BTLS survey as a performance-task proxy measure of conscientiousness. Selfreported non-cognitive skills measures, like the prior literature uses, are susceptible to multiple
types of bias such as reference group bias and social desirability bias (Duckworth & Yeager, 2015).
Because of these limitations, Duckworth and Yeager (2015) advise to exercise caution when using

existing self-reported measures of non-cognitive skills and highlight the importance of
developing novel performance-task based measures. In this respect, several recent studies
demonstrate the potential of item non-response as a performance-task based measure to proxy for
non-cognitive skills related to conscientiousness (Cheng, 2015; Cheng & Zamarro, 2018;

Robertson-Kraft and Duckworth (2014) only evaluate within-year teacher turnover decisions rather than between
years.
4
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Hedengren & Stratmann, 2012; Hitt et al., 2016; Kassenboehmer & Schurer, 2018; Marcus &
Schütz, 2005; Zamarro, Cheng, et al., 2018; Zamarro, Nichols, et al., 2018) 5.
Hedengren and Stratmann (2012), taking advantage of longitudinal nationally
representative samples of adolescents and adults from Germany and the U.S., find item nonresponse to be correlated with self-reported measures of conscientiousness and a strong predictor
of earnings and mortality risks later in life. Kassenboehmer and Schurer (2018) and Zamarro,
Cheng, Shakeel, & Hitt (2018) find similar correlations with self-reported conscientiousness.
Hitt, Trivitt, and Cheng (2016) utilize six nationally representative, longitudinal datasets of
American adolescents to show that the number of questions skipped on a paper and pencil survey
is a significant predictor of educational attainment and labor outcomes later in life, even after
controlling for cognitive ability. Lastly, Cheng and Zamarro (2018), using data from the
Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) longitudinal database, find that teacher item nonresponse rates on a baseline survey captures important dimensions of teacher quality as they are
found to be correlated with performance in classroom observation protocols and with student
ratings of their teachers. Teacher survey effort measures are also found to be related to students’
cognitive and non-cognitive skills like math test scores and student self-reported effort in class.
Data
We use the Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS), a 5 year nationally
representative panel dataset comprised of beginning teachers. Data collection began with the
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) in the 2007-08 school year (year 1) and the Teacher
Follow-up Survey (TFS) in 2008-09 (year 2). Responses to the initial SASS survey were
accepted between August 2007 and June 2008. BTLS extracted the subsample of first-year

5

See, Soland, Zamarro, Cheng, & Hitt (2019) for a detailed review of this literature.
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teachers in public schools from SASS and continued to interview those beginning teachers for 3
more school years after the TFS (2009-10 through 2011-12 school years, data years 3 to 5).
BTLS contains responses from almost 2,000 beginning teachers in the first year. These data are
unique in that the BTLS continued to collect data for teachers who decided to leave the
profession.
The 2007-08 iteration of SASS contained 5 questionnaires collecting information about
the school district, the school, the principal, the teacher, and the library media center. It is
possible to match the information of these 5 questionnaires through a unique school identifier.
Since the BTLS started as a subsample of SASS, we are able to match the first year teachers in
BTLS to the information collected through the other four questionnaires. In particular, we utilize
information collected from the school, principal, and teacher surveys.
Our analyses focus on full-time teachers6 in regular public schools 7. We also only look at
teachers who moved out of their original schools voluntarily. Since these data are based on
survey responses, involuntary teacher turnover is captured through self-reporting that their
contracts had not been renewed. About 5.6 percent of teachers self-reported they were terminated
and about 0.8 percent of teachers reported their contract was not renewed due to a layoff. With
these restrictions in place, and excluding incomplete records 8, our analytical sample size starts
with about 1,160 teachers.

Approximately 9.5 percent of teachers in our data are not full time teachers.
Restricting to teachers in regular schools excludes teachers in charter schools as charter school principals have
more discretion in the recruitment and firing policies of their teachers Only about 4.5 percent of teachers in our data
work in a charter school.
8 Approximately 22.6 percent of teacher in the data are excluded due to incomplete records.
6
7
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Measures of Teacher Turnover
We categorize teachers in a given year into 3 groups: stayers, school changers, and
leavers. Stayers are teachers who remain in the same school they taught in during year 1.
Changers are those who switch schools but continue to teach at some point during year 2 through
5. Leavers are teachers who attrite from the teaching profession anytime during years 2 through
5. For part of our analysis, we follow the convention in the literature of grouping school changers
and leavers in the same category, henceforth movers. The intuition behind the creation of a
combined mover category is that the costs for schools to fill a vacancy are the same regardless of
whether a teacher changes schools or quits teaching altogether; the school lacks one teacher and
may face pressure to fill the now vacant position. We also separate changers and leavers from the
mover group as part of our analysis to determine different effects on these 2 types of teacher
movements.
Figure 1 shows the rates of voluntary teacher turnover based on the leaver-changer
definition described above. Calculations of teacher turnover type are made based on the
surviving population who remained in their original school in a given year. After the first year of
teaching in our sample, about 21 percent of teachers exit their original schools voluntarily. The
percentage of teachers leaving the profession is highest after the first and second year of teaching
at 15 and 10 percent, respectively. The leaver rate then declines to 6 percent in year 4 and 5
percent in year 5. Except for year 4, the percentage of changers is less than half the percentage of
leavers. The proportion of changers is 6 percent in year 2, 3 percent in year 3, 5 percent prior to
year 4, and fell to 2 percent in year 5.
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Survey Effort as a Performance-Task Based Proxy Measure for Teacher Conscientiousness
We follow the work of Hitt, Trivitt, and Cheng (2016) and build a performance-task
based proxy measure for teacher conscientiousness based on a beginning teacher’s item nonresponse rate on the BTLS baseline survey (year 1). We divide the total number of questions a
teacher leaves blank by the number of answerable questions to which a teacher should have
responded, allowing legitimate skips. For ease of interpretation, we standardize this measure to
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in our empirical analysis.
The year 1 baseline survey was a long paper and pencil survey asking teachers to
complete up to 339 questions. On average, respondents were asked to answer approximately 175
questions. Figure 2 depicts the average item non-response for the baseline survey for all teachers
in their original schools for each year of the BTLS. The item non-response rate for the surviving
population of teachers who remain in their original school in a given year ranges from 2.2 to 2.5
percent in our sample. Due to teacher turnover, the sample appears to become slightly less
conscientious between years 1 and 2, since the average item non-response rate rises between
these years. The average item non-response rate then increases again between years 2 and 3.
Average item non-response falls very slightly by year 4, and rises to its highest point in year 5. In
other words, with the exception of year 4, the sample of teachers surviving in their orginal
schools appears less conscientious since they have higher rates of item non-response on the
baseline survey.
In a long survey such as the BTLS, it could be that teachers who are unsatisfied with their
jobs and are more likely to exit their schools will be less likely to fill out their surveys. Item nonresponse could then be capturing teachers’ satisfaction with their jobs and not just their levels of
conscientiousness. We constructed a measure of teachers’ job satisfaction using two different
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sets of questions on the baseline BTLS survey. The first set of questions uses teachers’ responses
to 4 questions regarding their satisfaction with salary, parent support, shared values with
colleagues in the school, and general satisfaction in the school. The second set of questions uses
responses to 7 questions about if the stress from teaching at the school are not “worth it,” if other
teachers at the school are satisfied, reported satisfaction with how the school is run, whether or
not they would exit for a better paying job, desire to transfer to another school, if their
enthusiasm is waning, and if they have considered staying home because they are “too tired to
go” to school. This scale consisting of these 11 questions together presents a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.77. Responses to each question are averaged to generate a single scale where lower average
responses correspond with teachers displaying higher job satisfaction. The correlation between
item non-response rates and our job satisfaction scale is 0.51. The positive correlation means that
lower item non-response rates are associated with higher levels of job satisfaction. This
correlation is moderate and may indicate that item non-response is measuring something similar
to job satisfaction in this context. Due to this correlation, we will control for job satisfaction in a
robustness check to study the independent effect of item non-response as a proxy for teachers’
conscientiousness levels.
Item non-response rates may also capture the opportunity cost of time to fill out the
survey, and teachers that have more time on their hands would have more time to fill out the
survey conscientiously. We would expect the opportunity cost of taking a long survey to
decrease with experience, but as our sample only contains information on beginning teachers,
they likely all have similar opportunity costs since they share the same amount of experience.
Based on current literature (see Soland et al., 2019, for a review), we argue that item nonresponse can be interpreted as a proxy for teachers’ conscientiousness and related skills.
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Measures of Principal Effectiveness and Other Determinants of Teacher Turnover
We follow previous literature and construct a measure of principal quality using a factor
analysis (see, Boyd et al., 2011; Grissom, 2011; Kraft et al., 2016; Loeb, et al. 2005). We use
responses to five questions on the baseline (year 1) teacher survey concerning principals’
administrative support, rules enforcement, principals’ communication, staff recognition, and
satisfaction towards the school. We expect principals earning high marks from teachers on these
questions to be high-quality principals. We use responses from all teachers in the school, not
only beginning teachers, who answer the questionnaire for any given principal. Using all
surveyed teachers in the school in the full SASS sample increases the amount of information
available to capture principal quality and limits bias in principal evaluations from the surveyed
beginning teachers who already decided to leave the profession or change schools prior to taking
the survey. We combine teachers’ principal evaluations using a principal components analysis
with a varimax (orthogonal) rotation to construct an index of principals’ quality. We retain a
unique factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1. All variables contribute almost equally to this
factor based on their similar factor loadings 9. We average the principal’ quality values predicted
from our factor analysis for all teachers in the same school. We assign these overall average
values of principals’ quality to each BTLS teacher in that same school to use as his/her
principal’s quality levels in the analysis of beginning teachers’ turnover. The principals’ quality
variable is then standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 to ease interpretation in
our analysis. A principal with a higher standardized quality factor than another principal is
considered a higher quality principal.

Appendix A contains the questions that are part of the principal’s effectiveness index and the factor loadings
derived from this factor analysis.
9
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In addition to the measure of principals’ quality, our empirical models also include
information derived from the baseline teacher survey on a teacher’s gender, race/ethnicity, type
of certification, educational attainment, whether or not the teacher reported having a mentor in
the school, and whether or not the teacher had passed the certification Praxis test in reading,
math, and writing as control variables in our analysis 10.
Using the baseline school survey from SASS, we also constructed variables for school
characteristics such as proportion of students who are black, Hispanic, and those who are eligible
free and reduced-price lunch (FRL), as well as school enrollment, school type (elementary,
middle, high, and combined11), magnet school status, and level of urbanicity in the school
location. Finally, we used baseline SASS principal surveys to obtain information on a principal’s
gender, race/ethnicity, experience as a principal, and prior experience as a teacher.
Since the BTLS data collection occurred during the Great Recession, we believe it can be
important to control for induced differences in local labor market conditions. Local labor market
conditions might also affect teachers differently depending on their conscientiousness levels.
Since conscientiousness is related to job performance, retention, and job satisfaction (Barrick &
Mount, 1991; Barrick & Zimmerman, 2009; Dalal, 2005; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Roberts et al.,
2007) and since item non-response rates are related to earnings and other labor outcomes
(Hedengren & Stratmann, 2012; Hitt et al., 2016), we believe that conscientious teachers will be

Praxis tests are widely used tests that attempt to measure what potential teachers know about their content area as
well as general teaching skills. Several states require passing these tests before a teacher may obtain a license. We
use indicator variables for a teacher passing the Praxis test for reading, math, or writing as a proxy for a teacher’s
cognitive ability. However, not all states require teachers to pass Praxis exams for certification, but our analysis
includes either state or region fixed effects which would take state differences in required Praxis testing into
account.
11 Combined schools are those that serve students in grades that cross over what would traditionally be considered
elementary, middle, or high schools.
10
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less likely than non-conscientious teachers to pursue outside labor market opportunities since the
Great Recession contracted the economy altogether.
If teachers’ relevant local labor markets are regions of the country themselves, then the
inclusion of region fixed effects should control for the effects of the Great Recession. However,
if relevant teachers’ local labor markets are smaller than their regions, then the effects of the
Great Recession on teacher turnover will vary within region. In order to control for the influence
of local labor market conditions in this case, we match BTLS data with the University of
Southern California’s Great Recession Indicators Database (GRID)12 (Angrisani et al., 2014).
Researchers at the USC Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research collected this
detailed dataset containing labor market indicators either monthly or yearly at the county level.
In this paper, we use information on monthly county-level unemployment rates. Since teachers
must make a decision regarding whether or not to return to their original school during the school
year, we used lagged average unemployment rates corresponding to each year. We average
monthly county-level unemployment rates for each school year. We difference the county-level
average unemployment rate for a school year relative to the county-level average unemployment
rate in the 2005-06 school year, before the Great Recession started, and include this measure of
unemployment rate shocks as control variable in our analysis 13. This measure captures the
percentage point change in the unemployment rate relative to when the national economy was
seemingly stable. We also include an interaction term between our measure of unemployment
shocks in the local labor market and teachers’ item non-response rates to allow for the possibility

Additional information about GRID can be found at this address:
https://cesr.usc.edu/prc/archived_pilot_proposals.
13 We also build a measure of recession intensity following Shores and Steinberg (2017). Our results are largely
unchanged based on the local labor market variable we include. We prefer to present results with our measure of
local labor market shocks because of its ease of interpretation. These results are available upon request.
12
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that labor market conditions affect teachers differently depending on their levels of
conscientiousness.
Empirical Strategy
We use two types of discrete duration models to study the determinants of teacher
turnover. First, we study the dynamics of teacher turnover decisions year by year using discrete
choice duration models for the probability of a teacher moving schools in a given year. In
particular, we estimate models with the following base specification:
Pr(𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑋) = Λ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑖,1 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑄𝑖,1 + 𝑻𝒊,𝟏 𝛽3 + 𝑺𝒊,𝟏 𝛽4 + 𝑷𝒊,𝟏 𝛽5 )

(1)

𝑡 = 2,3,4,5
𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 denotes a teacher 𝑖 leaving his/her original school in year 𝑡, either because the teacher
left the profession or changed schools, and Λ( ) denotes the cumulative logistic distribution
function. Then, the models estimated in (1) predict the probability that teacher 𝑖’s employment
spell, in a given school, ends at year 𝑡 conditional on the teacher surviving in the original school
up to that year. Since we are interested in the determinants of why a teaching spell in a school
would end, our sample for a given year includes all surviving teachers whose spells in the
original school have not ended, either because of leaving the profession or changing schools. As
updated characteristics of schools, such as the characteristics and quality of a new school’s
principal, are not available to us for those teachers changing schools, teachers who leave their
original schools only contribute to the analysis sample up to their last duration spell in their
original schools.
𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑖,1 is the teacher’s standardized item non-response rate measured on the baseline
survey during year 1 and is a proxy for the teacher’s conscientiousness. 𝑃𝑄𝑖,1 represents our
measure of a principal’s quality for the teacher’s principal at baseline. 𝑻𝒊,𝟏 includes teacher
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characteristics measured at baseline year 1: gender, race/ethnicity, if the teacher is alternatively
certified, if the teacher has a master’s degree or higher education, and if the teacher has passed
the Praxis exam in math, reading, or writing. 𝑺𝒊,𝟏 includes school demographics and
characteristics also measured at baseline: racial/ethnic composition of the school, proportion of
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, enrollment, and school urbanicity. 𝑷𝒊,𝟏 includes
characteristics of a teacher’s principal at baseline: gender, race/ethnicity, experience as a
principal, and experience teaching. Finally, we also include region fixed effects to account for
any remaining geographic unobserved factors. 14
We use three additional specifications to equation (1). First, we add in the interaction of
item non-response and our principals’ quality factor to test for differences in principals’ ability to
retain conscientious teachers. Second, we reestimate (1) but include the difference in
contemporary county-level unemployment rate and the 2006 county-level unemployment rate to
control for Great Recession indued changes in local labor market conditions. Finally, we
estimate a fully specified model including the interaction between item non-response and
principals’ quality, difference in county-level unemployment rates, and the interaction between
item non-response and the difference in county-level unemployment rates. We include the
second interaction term to test if unstable labor market conditions affects teachers differently
based on their levels of conscientiousness.
Our second set of analyses use competing-risk discrete choice duration models with a
multinomial logit specification, analogous to the model in (1) and the three additional

We also estimate this logit specification using state fixed effects in lieu of region fixed effects. We report region
fixed effects since we find that state perfectly predicts teacher turnover in several states. Our results, however, do
not substantively change based on the type of geographic fixed effects that we include.
14
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specifications described above15, but allowing for differential effects for the decisions of
changing schools or leaving the profession altogether.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of beginning teachers, as
well as dividing the sample into teachers who stayed in the same school for all 5 years of our
data and those who have ever moved from their original schools during years 2 to 5. Panel A
provides the descriptive statistics for teacher characteristics. On average, teachers leave 2 percent
of questions blank, but this rate is quite variable across teachers with a standard deviation of 4
percentage points (approximately 7 answerable questions). On average and over the course of all
five years, we do not find a statistically significant difference in item non-response rates between
teachers who ever move out of their original schools and those who stay in their original schools
all five years.16 Three-fourths of teachers in the sample are female and 90 percent are white. Just
over 25 percent of teachers are alternatively certified 17 and 16 percent have completed some
graduate-level coursework. Movers are statistically significantly more likely to be alternatively
certified. Nearly 90 percent of teachers reported they have a mentor. Less than half of teachers
have passed their Praxis tests in reading, math, or writing.
Panel B displays the summary statistics for school characteristics. Teachers are in schools
with, on average, 17 percent black students, 21 percent Hispanic students, and 46 percent Free

We had to use region fixed effects in our multinomial logit models because of problems of convergence in our
maximization algorithm due to the fact that state perfectly predicted teacher turnover in some states. Our results
from the binary logit models do not change significantly when we include region fixed effects instead of state fixed
effects, which makes us believe that most of the omitted factors that state fixed effects are capturing are probably
also fixed within region.
16 Figure 2 documents an overall increase in item non-response rate over the five years, but the difference in item
non-response rates among movers and stayers is not statistically significant.
17 The BTLS survey does not ask about which specific alternative certification program a teacher entered the
classroom through.
15
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and Reduced price Lunch (FRL) eligible students. Teachers leave schools with higher
proportions of black and FRL students at a statistically significantly higher rate. Average
enrollment is 847 students. Elementary schools constitute 46 percent of the sample, middle
schools are 19 percent, 29 percent are high schools, and the rest are schools that combined
grades. Magnet schools comprise 8 percent of the sample. Finally, suburban schools comprise
almost 30 percent of schools, towns make up 16 percent, rural schools are 32 percent, and the
remaining 25 percent are city schools.
Panel C contains descriptive statistics for principal variables. Average principal quality
does not differ significantly between teachers in the stayer and mover groups. Female principals
make up half of the sample, while black and Hispanic principals make up only 11 percent and 9
percent of the sample, respectively. Principals have an average of 12 years of experience as
principals, but only 0.21 years of experience as a teacher. The average principal experience as a
teacher for teachers who move out of their original schools within the first five years is higher
than the average principal experience as a teacher for the stayer group.
Determinants of Teacher Turnover
We present the results of our discrete choice duration models in Tables 2 through 5. The
first column estimates the specification in equation (1) while the second column includes the
interaction between item non-response rates and principals’ quality. We include this interaction
to study principals’ ability to retain more conscientious teachers (i.e. those who put more effort
on their baseline survey). Column 3 controls for shocks to the local labor market using changes
in unemployment rates as compared to the pre-Great Recession levels and Column 4 adds in
interactions between item non-response rates and both principals’ quality and the change in
unemployment rates. We add in the interaction effect between our proxy measure of
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conscientiousness and changes in unemployment rates because we would expect that more
conscientious teachers would be less likely to test volatile labor markets. All tables present
average marginal effects.
Item non-response rate is negatively related to the likelihood of teacher turnover for
teachers’ second year in the profession in all models in Table 2. In the fully specified model, a 1
standard deviation increase in item non-response rate is associated with a 4 percentage point
reduction in the probability of teacher turnover, but it is only significant at the 10 percent
significance level. In other words, those teachers who show higher levels of conscientiousnesss
while completing the baseline survey are more likely to exit their schools prior to their second
year as a teacher. This effect represents nearly a fifth of the overall first-year teacher turnover
rate of approximately 20 percent of teachers in our sample. Teachers with higher quality
principals were more likely to be retained, with a 3 percentage point reduction in the probability
of teacher turnover in the fully specified model. None of the interaction terms were statistically
significant predictors of teacher turnover after teachers’ first year. It is worth noting the direction
of these interaction effects: teacher turnover has a negative association the interaction of item
non-response rate and principal quality and a positive relationship with the interaction of item
non-response rate and changes in the county-level unemployment rate. Including the measure of
outside labor market volatility did not change the effects of item non-response rates or principal
quality on teacher turnover very drastically.
Tables 3 through 5 present our results for the determinants of teacher turnover prior to
teachers’ third, fourth, or fifth year in their schools. To be included in these results, teachers must
have survived the first 2, 3, or 4 years in their original schools, respectively.
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For year 3 (Table 3), we fail to find a significant relationship between item non-response
rates and teacher turnover in the any of our models, though we do find that the relationship is
still negative. We find that teachers in schools with higher quality principals are more likely to
exit at a statistically insignificant rate, but we do find that there is a significant interaction effect
with item non-response for year 3. Teachers with 1 standard deviation higher item non-response
rates (less conscientious teachers) who are in schools with 1 standard deviation higher quality
principals are 4.3 percentage points less likely to exit their schools. In other words, high-quality
principals appear more effective at retaining teachers who showed lower levels of
conscientiousness on their baseline survey in this case. Similarly to year 2, we find no evidence
that local labor market conditions have a relationship with teacher turnover, but the coefficient is
still greater than zero.
For year 4 (Table 4), like we found for year 2, we find that there is a significant negative
relationship between conscientiousness and teacher turnover in our fully specified model.
Teachers with a 1 standard deviation higher item non-response rate (less conscientious teachers)
are 14.4 percentage points less likely to move out of their schools. While statistically
insignificant in 3 out of 4 specifications, the sign on item non-response is negative, which
mirrors the sign in year 2. However, changes in county-level unemployment rates mediate this
large item non-response effect; teachers with lower levels of consciousness, measured as leaving
more questions blank on their baseline surveys, and living in counties with higher unemployment
rates relative to 2006 were more likely to exit their schools. In other words, it appears that
instability in local labor market might have helped retain more conscientious teachers. Also,
changes in county-level unemployment rates relative to 2006 are a statistically significant
predictor of teacher turnover in this case. A 1 percentage point increase in the county-level
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unemployment rate relative to 2006 is associated with a 1.6 percentage point reduction in the
probability of teacher turnover in the fully specified year 3 model. Finally, aligning with the
results in year 2, higher quality principals are more likely to retain teachers. Teachers in schools
with 1 standard deviation higher quality principals are between 3.1 and 3.8 percentage points less
likely to exit their schools. However, we do not find differences on quality principal’s ability of
retaining teachers of difference levels of conscientiousness in this case as the interaction between
item non-response rates and principals’ quality is statistically insignificant.
Results for year 5 (Table 5) show that there is a significant positive relationship between
item non-response rates and teacher turnover in the full model. This is the only year for which
lower rates of item non-response correspond with lower rates of teacher turnover. Principals’
quality is also related to a decrease in the likelihood of teacher turnover. The interaction term for
item non-response rates and principals’ quality is negative and statistically significant
compensating the overall effect of teacher’s conscientousness; 1 standard deviation gains in both
item non-response and principals’ quality corresponds with a nearly 6 percentage point decline in
the probability that teachers exit their schools. Just as for year 3, this effect reveals that high
quality principals are more effective at retaining less conscientious teachers. There was no effect
of local labor market volatility on teacher turnover. The interaction term for item non-response
and local labor market volatility, however, was negative and significant. This interaction effect
for year 5 differs from the effect in year 4; conscientious teachers are more likely to be retained
when local labor markts are less stable prior to their fourth year in their schools, but these labor
market conditions decrease the likelihood of retention by the fifth year.
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 through 5 demonstrate a four clear patterns.
Teacher turnover is less likely among teachers displaying lower levels of conscientiousness (i.e.
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higher item non-response rates) for the first four years of teachers’ careers. Higher quality
principals were always reduce the probability of teacher turnover and these principals were more
effective at retaining the teachers that leave more questions blank on the baseline survey. Finally,
teacher with higher item non-response rates in counties with comparatively higher
unemployment rates are less likely to be retained through year four in the profession.
Tables 6 through 9 display the results for our competing-risk discrete duration models18.
Panel A includes determinants of the probability of leaving the profession and Panel B includes
the determinants of the probability of changing schools. These Tables are set up in the same way
as Tables 2 through 5 described above.
Table 6 has the results for the likelihood of leaving the profession and changing schools
for year 2. None of our variables of interest predict the probability of leaving the profession after
teachers’ first year in the profession. However, item non-response rates are significantly related
to the probability of changing schools after teachers’ first year in the profession. Teachers with 1
standard deviation higher item non-response rates than other comparable teachers are 4.7
percentage points less likely to change schools. This means that less conscientious teachers on
the baseline survey are less likely to change schools while still remaining in the profession.
Principals’ quality, both interaction terms, and local labor market volatility are not associated
with changing schools in the second year.
In year 3 (Table 7), our results indicate that higher item non-response rates, principals’
quality, and local labor market conditions are not related to the probability of exiting the
profession. However, the interaction between item non-response and principals’ quality is
associated with the likelihood of leaving the profession in the fully specified model; the

Results for the probability of teachers staying in their original schools are very similar to the results contained in
Tables 3 through 6 as it would be expected.
18
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interacation is negative suggesting that high quality principals retain teachers leaving more
questions blank (lower conscientiousness) in the profession. Item non-response is statistically
insignificant in all of the year 3 specifications for changing schools. Higher quality principals are
associated with decreases in the probability that teachers’ switch schools. A one standard
deviation increase in principal quality is associated with a 2 percentage point decrease in the
probability of a teacher changing schools.
Item non-response rates predict the probability of exiting the profession in the fully
specified model for year 4 (Table 8) and this effect is large in size at a 9.9 percentage point
reduction in the probability of leaving the profession for a 1 standard deviation increase in item
non-response rate, indicating that less conscientious teachers are better retained in the profession.
Exiting the profession is also related to principals’ quality and changes in unemployment rates
relative to 2006. Higher quality principals help retain teachers in the profession while greater
instability in the labor market seems to be pushing teachers out of the profession, more so for
less conscientious teachers (higher item non-reponse rates on their baseline survey). Finally,
none of our main explanatory variable are associated with the probability of changing schools in
this case.
For year 5 (Table 9), teachers with higher item non-response rates (lower
conscientiousness teachers) and similar quality principals are more likely to exit the profession.
High quality principals are again associated with decreases in teachers’ likelihood of exiting the
profession. High quality principals also appear to be better at retaining their less conscientious
teachers in the profession and their school in year 5. Item non-response itself is not a significant
predictor of changing schools in the final year, nor is principals’ quality. However, similarly to
leaving the profession, teachers answering fewer questions on their baseline surveys (higher item
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non-response) that are also in schools with higher quality principals are less likely to change
schools in year 5. Increases in unemployment rates relative to 2006 are related to decreases in the
probability of changing schools.
General patterns are less obvious in our multinomial analysis. There is a suggestively
negative association between item non-response and the likelihood teachers leave the profession
in the first four years. Higher quality principals reduce the probabity that teachers leave the
profession or switch to a different school, but these principals are more effective at retaining
teachers displaying lower levels of conscientiousness on their baseline surveys in the profession
and schools. Higher county level unemployment rates relative to pre-Great Recession rates is
predictive of teachers leaving the profession, but negatively related to teachers switching
schools. Both effects are magnified for teachers leaving more questions blank on the baseline
survey.
Robustness Checks
We conduct two sets of robustness checks for our results. The first check tests our
measure of principals’ quality. As described in the Data section, we perform a factor analysis for
all teachers in the 2007-08 SASS dataset and create an index for all teachers in the same school.
We average the index for all teachers in the same school. This robustness check removes
beginning teachers’ responses in the factor analysis altogether. The results of this first check are
available in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 contains results for the probability of teachers moving
out of their schools and Table 11 contains results from the multinomial logit models for the
proability of leaving the profession (Panel A) and changing schools (Panel B). Both tables
include results from our fully specified model.
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Results for all four years and for both the logit and multinomial logit models do not
change our overall conclusions. Item non-response remains significant in all models and
becomes significant at higher confidence levels in four cases. We do find that year 2 and year 5
principals’ quality effects become insignificant as predictors of teacher turnover (Table 10) and
leaving the profession (Table 11, Panel A). Beginning teachers’ responses to the questions
included in the factor analysis may be driving these principal effects, but significant findings in
years 3 and 4 are consistent regardless of who is included in the factor analysis.
Our second robustness check formally controls for job satisfaction using the scale
described in the Data section. Given the moderate correlation between item non-response rates
and the job satisfaction measure (0.51), it is likely that teachers’ job satisfaction affects their
propensity to answer a long paper and pencil survey. Teachers answering more questions (lower
item non-response) tend to have higher job satisfaction (lower values on the job satisfaction
scale). Controlling for job satisfaction in our models would lend credence to item non-response
as a proxy of conscientiousness. Results for this check are available in Tables 12 and 13. Table
12 includes the results for the probability that teachers exit their schools and Table 13 includes
the results for the probability that teachers leave the profession (Panel A) and change schools
(Panel B). Tables 12 and 13 include fully specified models.
Item non-response effects are not only robust in all cases but increase in magnitude for
years 2, 3, and 4 (Table 12). Controlling for job satisfaction, teachers with a 1 standard deviation
higher item non-response rate than other teachers, where the teachers have comparable
principals, are 12.3 percentage points less likely to exit their schools prior to year 2; the effect is
4 percentage points when not controlling for job satisfaction (Table 2, Column 4). Principals’
quality is a no longer a significant predictor of teacher turnover in year 2 when controlling for
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job satisfaction, but the effect remains for years 4 and 5. Higher job satisfaction is associated
with reductions in the probability of teacher turnover in all years except for year 5. The
interaction between item non-response rates and principals’ quality is negative and significant for
years 2, 3, and 4 suggesting that principals are more effective at retaining the teachers who leave
more questions blank on their baseline survey. Results related to changes in the unemployment
rate and the interaction between item non-response rate and changes in the unemployment rate
are robust to the inclusion of job satisfaction.
Results for the probability of leaving the profession are also generally robust to the
inclusion of job satisfaction (Table 13, Panel A). Controlling for job satisfaction, item nonresponse rates are statistically significant predictors of the probability of leaving the profession
in years 2 and 3, with teachers showing lower levels of conscientiousness in the baseline survey
showing lower probabilities of leaving the profession; item non-response rates are not significant
for these years in our main results. Item non-response rates and principals’ quality remain
significant in years 4 and 5. The only effect that is not robust when including job satisfaction is
the interaction between item non-response rates and principals’ quality in year 5, but these
interaction effects are now negative and significant in years 2 and 3. Indicating, as before, that
higher quality teachers appear more effective at retaining teachers who show lower levels of
conscientiousness in their baseline survey. Changes in county-level unemployment rates relative
to 2006 and the interaction effect of changes in county-level unemployment rates and item nonresponse rates remain significant in year 4 while this interaction effect also becomes significant
in year 3. Higher levels of unemployment lead to a higher probability of teachers leaving the
profession in year 4 but more conscientious teachers appear to be better retain in unstable labor
conditions in years 3 and 4.
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Once again, results for the probability of changing schools are robust when controlling
for job satisfaction (Table 13, Panel B); but in line with the results from Table 12 and Table 13,
Panel A, we even find more significant effects in this case.
Conclusion
Teacher turnover is an important policy concern, given its adverse consequences for
student achievement and the large financial costs it imposes on schools. Teacher turnover is
especially problematic among beginning teachers. While a breadth of literature has studied the
determinants of teacher turnover, we evaluate how teachers’ levels of conscientiousness might
affect the likelihood of teacher turnover. Since teacher conscientiousness is a predictor of teacher
quality and burnout (Kim et al., 2019), understanding these patterns of teacher turnover can help
stakeholders to better design retention policies to use their resources as efficiently as possible.
We use the national Beginning Teacher Longitudinal Study to study the determinants of
teacher turnover. We proxy for teachers’ levels of conscientiousness with a performance-task
based measure of survey effort: baseline survey item non-response rate. We rely on previous
literature which shows that item non-response can be a valid performance-task proxy measure
for non-cognitive skills related to conscientiousness (Hitt et al., 2016) and that teachers’ item
non-response rates may capture important teacher quality dimensions that value-added test score
based measures miss (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018).
We observe that teachers presenting higher levels of conscientiousness through their
effort on their baseline surveys were more likely to exit their schools immediately after their first
year in the profession. Teachers that switch to different schools appear to drive this effect of
survey effort. We also show that survey effort is weakly related to teacher turnover prior to
teachers’ fourth year in the profession. We corroborate the important role principals can play in
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reducing the probability of teacher exits. However, our results also show that principals might be
less effective at retaining teachers with higher levels of conscientiousness on their baseline
survey. Unstable local labor markets, on the other hand, might help retain teachers with higher
levels of conscientiousness.
Our finding that beginning teachers with higher item non-response on the baseline
survey, displaying lower levels of conscientiousness, are more likely to stay falls in line with
findings from Wiswall (2013). In North Carolina, beginning retained teachers have lower math
value-added than the beginning teachers that leave. This concurrence of our two results provides
additional reason to believe that item non-response is capturing meaningful dimensions of
teacher quality that are important for schools and students.
However, our results appear to come in conflict two previous studies that find
conscientious teachers are more likely to be retained (Bastian et al., 2017; Robertson-Kraft &
Duckworth, 2014). We offer two explanations for this divergence. First, we use a national
sample of beginning teachers whereas the other studies use only a sample of first-year teachers
from North Carolina (Bastian et al., 2017) or a convenience sample of Teach for America
teachers (Robertson-Kraft & Duckworth, 2014). Second, we measure conscientiousness using a
behavioral measure. Bastian et al. (2017) use self-reported measures of conscientiousness and
Robertson-Kraft and Duckworth (2014) use grit. For our sample, item non-response rates may be
measuring conscientiousness differently than grit or a self-report of conscientiousness.
Our results have two important implications for policy. First, these results suggest the
need for better strategies to retain highly conscientious teachers in general. To the extent our
survey effort measures capture teachers’ conscientiousness (Hedengren & Stratmann, 2012; Hitt
et al., 2016) and meaningful dimensions of teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018), our
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finding that teachers with lower item non-response rates are more likely to exit their schools
implies that district policymakers should do more to retain more conscientious teachers.
Second, principals’ current efforts may not be completely successful at retaining more
conscientious teachers. We find that high-quality principals seem to be more effective at
retaining teachers who are lower quality using survey effort as a proxy for conscientiousness as
our measure of teacher quality. Grissom and Bartanen (2018) find that high-quality principals
strategically retain high-quality teachers when teacher quality is measured with principals’
classroom observations of teachers. Our results may differ from Grissom and Bartanen because
we define both teacher and principal quality differently and use different measures of these
constructs. They find evidence of strategic retention when measuring teacher quality with
classroom observation scores that principals typically conduct and when using superintendents’
evaluations of principals as their measure of principal quality. The principals’ observations of
teachers in Grissom and Bartanen’s study likely captures teacher quality dimensions different
from teachers’ levels of conscientiousness.
Our results are limited since the BTLS survey does not contain any direct measure of
conscientiousness and our proxy measure, item non-response, is a noisy measure that could be
capturing other unobserved factors along with teachers’ conscientiousness. It should be stressed,
however, that our results are robust and become bigger in magnitude and more significant when
including self-reported measures of job satisfaction in the model. More research is needed to
fully understand the role of teachers’ conscientiousness on turnover decisions, but our paper
provides evidence that local labor market conditions and principal quality can have a role to play
in affecting the characteristics of teachers who are retained.
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Additionally, we study the determinants of voluntary teacher turnover. Teachers may not
want to admit on a survey if they exited the profession or switched to another school
involuntarily. Since we rely on teachers to self-report if they were terminated or laid off, we may
be including teachers that did not choose to leave their schools in our analyses.
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Figure 1: Proportions of Teachers who Change Schools or Leave the Profession by Year
Note: Calculations based on the surviving sample of teachers remaining in their original school
in a given year. Changers switch to a new school, leavers exit the profession, and stayers remain
in their original schools. Approximately 1,290 teachers in year 1, 1,160 teachers in year 2, 940 in
year 3, 700 in year 4 and 560 in year 5. Year 1 is the 2007-08 school year, year 2 is the 2008-09
school year, year 3 is the 2009-10 school year, year 4 is the 2010-11 school year, and year 5 is
the 2011-12 school year. Provided calculations using sampling weights.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Figure 2: Average Item Non-Response based on Surviving Teacher Population
Note: Calculations based on the surviving sample of teachers remaining in their original school
in a given year. Approximately 1,290 teachers in year 1, 910 teachers in year 2, 810 in year 3,
620 in year 4 and 520 in year 5. Year 1 is the 2007-08 school year, year 2 is the 2008-09 school
year, year 3 is the 2009-10 school year, year 4 is the 2010-11 school year, and year 5 is the 201112 school year. Provided calculations using sampling weights.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Teacher, School, and Principal Characteristics – Overall and
by Moving Status
Mean
Mean
Variable
Mean
SD
Stayers
Movers
Panel A: Teacher Characteristics
Item Non-Response
Answerable Questions

0.02

0.04

0.02

0.02

175.33

12.73

175.09

175.65

Female

0.73

0.72

0.75

Hispanic

0.11

0.11

0.10

White

0.90

0.92

0.88

Black

0.08

0.07

0.11

Alt. Cert.

0.26

0.19

0.34

≥ Master’s Degree

0.16

0.16

0.16

Had a Mentor

0.85

0.84

0.86

Pass Read. Praxis

0.39

0.41

0.37

Pass Math Praxis

0.38

0.40

0.36

Pass Writing Praxis

0.49

0.52

0.46

Panel B: School Characteristics
Proportion Black

0.17

0.23

0.15

0.20

Proportion Hispanic

0.21

0.29

0.19

0.24

Proportion FRL

0.46

0.28

0.42

0.51

847.25

599.16

862.52

827.50

Enrollment
Elementary School

0.46

0.48

0.44

Middle School

0.19

0.17

0.22

Combined School

0.06

0.05

0.06

Magnet School

0.08

0.08

0.08

Suburb

0.28

0.30

0.26

Town

0.16

0.19

0.13

Rural

0.32

0.30

0.35
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Table 1 (Cont.)
Variable

Mean

SD

Mean
Stayers

Mean
Movers

0.20
0.52

0.05
0.46

Panel C: Principal Characteristics
Principal Factor
Female

0.13
0.50

Black

0.11

0.10

0.14

Hispanic

0.09

0.07

0.11

Experience
Teaching Exp.

0.95

12.47

7.03

12.33

12.65

0.21

1.42

0.09

0.36

Note: Sample size approx. 1,230 for all teachers, 650 for stayers, and 570 for movers. Bolded
sample means are statistically significant at p<0.1. Provided calculations using sampling
weights.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 2: Determinants of Teacher Turnover prior to Year 2 (2008-09), Average Marginal Effects

Item Non-Response
Rate
Principal Quality

Base
Specification
(1)
-0.039*
(0.021)
-0.023*
(0.013)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

With
Interaction
(2)
-0.044**
(0.022)
-0.030**
(0.013)
-0.029
(0.022)

With Labor
Fully Specified
Market Control
(3)
(4)
-0.039*
-0.040*
(0.020)
(0.023)
-0.023*
-0.030**
(0.013)

-0.017
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.012)

Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.013)
-0.031
(0.022)
-0.012
(0.013)
0.023
(0.027)

School Characteristics

X

X

X

X

Teacher Characteristics
Principal Characteristics
Region Fixed Effects

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Note: Sample size approx. 1,160 teachers Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 3: Determinants of Teacher Turnover prior to Year 3 (2009-10), Average Marginal Effects

Item Non-Response
Rate
Principal Quality

Base
Specification
(1)
0.013
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.013)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

With
Interaction
(2)
0.008
(0.011)
-0.012
(0.013)
-0.040**
(0.017)

With Labor
Fully Specified
Market Control
(3)
(4)
0.013
-0.019
(0.011)
(0.029)
-0.007
-0.013
(0.013)

0.002
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.007)

Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
School Characteristics
Teacher Characteristics
Principal Characteristics
Region Fixed Effects

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

(0.013)
-0.043**
(0.018)
0.003
(0.007)
0.010
(0.009)
X
X
X
X

Note: Sample size approx. 940 teachers Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 4: Determinants of Teacher Turnover prior to Year 4 (2010-11), Average Marginal Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.019
-0.022
-0.021
-0.144**
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.060)
-0.032**
-0.036***
-0.031**
-0.038***
Principal Quality
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.014)
-0.019
-0.024
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
(0.023)
(0.023)
0.013**
0.016**
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.021**
(0.009)

Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
School Characteristics

X

X

X

X

Teacher Characteristics
Principal Characteristics
Region Fixed Effects

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Note: Sample size approx. 700 teachers Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 5: Determinants of Teacher Turnover prior to Year 5 (2011-12), Average Marginal Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.013
0.011
0.013
0.054**
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.026)
-0.017
-0.028**
-0.018
-0.029**
Principal Quality
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.013)
-0.059***
-0.057***
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
(0.021)
(0.021)
-0.006
-0.007
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.007)
(0.007)
-0.011*
(0.006)

Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
School Characteristics

X

X

X

X

Teacher Characteristics
Principal Characteristics
Region Fixed Effects

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Note: Sample size approx. 560 teachers Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 6: Determinants of Leaving and Changing prior to Year 2 (2008-09), Average Marginal
Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Probability of Leaving
-0.005
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.014)
Principal Quality

-0.011
(0.011)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

-0.009
(0.016)

-0.005
(0.014)

-0.005
(0.016)

-0.016
(0.012)
-0.025
(0.017)

-0.011
(0.011)

-0.017
(0.012)
-0.028
(0.018)

-0.008
(0.011)

-0.003
(0.012)
0.024
(0.023)

-0.048**
(0.020)
-0.011

-0.047**
(0.020)
-0.011

-0.047**
(0.019)
-0.011

(0.011)
0.001
(0.022)

(0.007)

(0.011)
0.001
(0.022)
-0.010

Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
Panel B: Probability of Changing
-0.048**
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.020)
-0.012
Principal Quality
(0.007)
Non-Response *
Principal Quality

-0.009
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.007)

(0.006)
-0.003
(0.014)

Note: Sample size approx. 1,160 teachers. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 7: Determinants of Leaving and Changing prior to Year 3 (2009-10), Average Marginal
Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Probability of Leaving
0.010
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.008)
Principal Quality

0.014
(0.012)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

0.010
(0.009)

0.010
(0.009)

-0.020
(0.026)

0.011
(0.012)
-0.024
(0.015)

0.014
(0.012)

0.011
(0.012)
-0.028*
(0.015)

0.001
(0.006)

0.002
(0.006)
0.012
(0.008)

-0.005
(0.009)
-0.022***

0.003
(0.009)
-0.019***

0.000
(0.015)
-0.022***

(0.008)
-0.018
(0.015)

(0.007)

(0.007)
-0.016
(0.014)
0.002

Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
Panel B: Probability of Changing
0.003
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.009)
-0.019***
Principal Quality
(0.007)
Non-Response *
Principal Quality

0.003
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.003)

(0.003)
-0.002
(0.005)

Note: Sample size approx. 940 teachers. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 8: Determinants of Leaving and Changing prior to Year 4 (2010-11), Average Marginal
Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Probability of Leaving
-0.020
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.016)
Principal Quality

-0.024**
(0.010)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

-0.023
(0.018)

-0.025
(0.016)

-0.099**
(0.042)

-0.026**
(0.012)
-0.010
(0.019)

-0.025**
(0.010)

-0.027**
(0.012)
-0.011
(0.019)

0.014***
(0.004)

0.016***
(0.004)
0.013*
(0.007)

-0.009
(0.009)
-0.010

-0.008
(0.009)
-0.008

-0.056
(0.041)
-0.012

(0.007)
-0.010
(0.011)

(0.007)

(0.008)
-0.013
(0.013)
-0.001

Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
Panel B: Probability of Changing
-0.008
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.009)
-0.008
Principal Quality
(0.007)
Non-Response *
Principal Quality

-0.002
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.004)

(0.004)
0.008
(0.007)

Note: Sample size approx. 700. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender,
ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s
degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition
of school, proportion of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch in school, school
enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender, principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience,
principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 9: Determinants of Leaving and Changing prior to Year 5 (2011-12), Average Marginal
Effects
Base
With
With Labor
Fully Specified
Specification
Interaction
Market Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Probability of Leaving
0.011
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.012)
Principal Quality

-0.014
(0.009)

Non-Response *
Principal Quality

0.011
(0.011)

0.011
(0.012)

0.041*
(0.022)

-0.020**
(0.010)
-0.029*
(0.016)

-0.014
(0.009)

-0.020**
(0.010)
-0.028*
(0.015)

0.001
(0.005)

0.000
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.011)
-0.008

-0.000
(0.011)
-0.003

0.023
(0.016)
-0.010

(0.006)
-0.037**
(0.014)

(0.007)

(0.008)
-0.039**
(0.017)
-0.010**

Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
Panel B: Probability of Changing
-0.001
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.009)
-0.002
Principal Quality
(0.007)
Non-Response *
Principal Quality

-0.008*
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

(0.004)

(0.004)
-0.011
(0.007)

Note: Sample size approx. 560 teachers. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if
teacher has greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam
in math, reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free
or reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 10: Determinants of Teacher Turnover Excluding Beginning Teachers from Principals’
Quality Factor Analysis for All Years, Average Marginal Effects
Year 2
Item Non-Response
Rate
Principal Quality
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
School Characteristics

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

(1)
-0.043**
(0.022)
-0.005

(2)
-0.023
(0.028)
-0.002

(3)
-0.142**
(0.062)
-0.027**

(4)
0.069***
(0.026)
-0.013

(0.013)
-0.028
(0.017)
-0.011
(0.013)

(0.014)
-0.045***
(0.016)
0.003
(0.007)

(0.012)
-0.008
(0.018)
0.016**
(0.006)

(0.013)
-0.044***
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.007)

0.028
(0.027)

0.008
(0.009)

0.021**
(0.010)

-0.014***
(0.005)

X

X

X

X

Teacher Characteristics
X
X
X
X
Principal Characteristics
X
X
X
X
Region Fixed Effects
X
X
X
X
Note: Sample size approx. 1,150 teachers in year 2, 940 teachers in year 3, 700 teachers in year
4, and 560 teachers in year 5. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if teacher has
greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam in math,
reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects. Presents fully specified models analogous to Column (4) in Tables 2 through 5.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 11: Determinants of Leaving and Changing Excluding Beginning Teachers from
Principals’ Quality Factor Analysis for All Years, Average Marginal Effects
Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: Probability of Leaving
-0.005
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.015)

-0.036
(0.029)

-0.096**
(0.042)

0.049**
(0.022)

0.001
(0.012)
-0.020
(0.014)
-0.004

0.013
(0.014)
-0.042***
(0.013)
0.002

-0.022**
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.013)
0.016***

-0.012
(0.009)
-0.025**
(0.010)
0.000

(0.011)
0.027
(0.022)

(0.006)
0.013
(0.008)

(0.005)
0.013*
(0.007)

(0.005)
-0.009**
(0.004)

0.010
(0.020)
-0.012**

-0.055
(0.044)
-0.006

0.028*
(0.017)
-0.001

(0.006)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.001
(0.003)

(0.007)
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.004)

(0.011)
-0.025
(0.015)
-0.010**
(0.004)

-0.004
(0.006)

0.008
(0.007)

-0.010
(0.006)

Principal Quality
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

Panel B: Probability of Changing
-0.050**
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.020)
-0.004
Principal Quality
(0.010)
-0.005
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
(0.020)
-0.008
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.007)
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate

-0.002
(0.014)

Note: Sample size approx. 1,150 teachers in year 2, 940 teachers in year 3, 700 teachers in year
4, and 560 teachers in year 5. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if teacher has
greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam in math,
reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects. Presents fully specified models analogous to Column (4) in Tables 6 through 9.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 12: Determinants of Teacher Turnover Controlling for Teachers’ Job Satisfaction for All
Years, Average Marginal Effects
Year 2
Item Non-Response
Rate
Principal Quality
Job Disatisfaction
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
Change Unemp. Rate
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
School Characteristics
Teacher Characteristics
Principal Characteristics

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

(1)
-0.123***
(0.031)
-0.013

(2)
-0.059*
(0.035)
-0.010

(3)
-0.156***
(0.058)
-0.031**

(4)
0.050*
(0.028)
-0.029**

(0.014)
0.123***
(0.022)
-0.051**
(0.025)

(0.014)
0.044***
(0.015)
-0.056***
(0.020)

(0.014)
0.047***
(0.017)
-0.034
(0.025)

(0.013)
0.012
(0.021)
-0.063**
(0.025)

-0.019
(0.015)
0.001
(0.032)

0.004
(0.007)
0.014
(0.010)

0.015**
(0.006)
0.021**
(0.009)

-0.007
(0.007)
-0.012*
(0.007)

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Region Fixed Effects
X
X
X
X
Note: Sample size approx. 1,160 teachers in year 2, 940 teachers in year 3, 700 teachers in year
4, and 560 teachers in year 5. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if teacher has
greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam in math,
reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects. Presents fully specified models analogous to Column (4) in Tables 2 through 5.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Table 13: Determinants of Leaving and Changing Controlling for Teachers’ Job Satisfaction for
All Years, Average Marginal Effects
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Probability of Leaving
-0.049*
-0.065*
-0.098**
0.043*
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.026)
(0.033)
(0.040)
(0.024)
-0.010
0.013
-0.023*
-0.020**
Principal Quality
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.010)
0.059***
0.039***
0.024*
-0.005
Job Disatisfaction
(0.019)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
-0.041**
-0.042**
-0.013
-0.025
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
(0.019)
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.017)
-0.006
0.003
0.015***
0.001
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.005)
0.012
0.017*
0.012*
-0.007
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.027)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.005)
Panel B: Probability of Changing
-0.079***
Item Non-Response
Rate
(0.016)
-0.001
Principal Quality
(0.010)
0.066***
Job Disatisfaction
(0.011)
-0.006
Non-Response *
Principal Quality
(0.016)
-0.013**
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.007)
-0.012
Non-Response *
Change Unemp. Rate
(0.013)

0.001
(0.014)
-0.021***
(0.007)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.016
(0.013)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.005)

-0.058
(0.044)
-0.010
(0.008)
0.023*
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.007
(0.007)

0.024*
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.027*
(0.015)
-0.046**
(0.019)
-0.011**
(0.004)
-0.014**
(0.007)

Note: Sample size approx. 1,160 teachers in year 2, 940 teachers in year 3, 700 teachers in year
4, and 560 teachers in year 5. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Controls for teacher’s gender, ethnicity, if teacher is alternatively certified, if teacher has
greater than or equal to a Master’s degree, if the teacher has passed the Praxis exam in math,
reading, or writing, ethnic composition of school, proportion of students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch in school, school enrollment, school urbanicity, principal’s gender,
principal’s ethnicity, principal’s experience, principal’s experience teaching, and region fixed
effects. Presents fully specified models analogous to Column (4) in Tables 6 through 9.
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Appendix A: Factor Loadings for Teacher Evaluations of Principal Quality Factor
Appendix Table A.1: Factor Loadings for Teacher Evaluations of Principal’s Quality Factor
Variable
Factor
Loadings
Principal Effectiveness Factor (Eigenvalue = 3.12, Cronbach’s alpha =
0.85)
“The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is supportive and
encouraging.”

0.83

“My principal enforces school rules for student conduct and backs me up
when I need it.”

0.82

“The principal knows what kind of school he or she wants and has
communicated it to the staff.”

0.80

“In this school, staff members are recognized for a job well done.”

0.78

“I am generally satisfied with being a teacher at this school.”

0.72

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study (BTLS) “First Through Fifth Waves Data File,” 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11, and 2012-12.
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Chapter 2: Teacher Attrition and Teacher Pension Costs
Introduction
Actuarial assumptions have a broad impact on the measured financial health of teacher
retirement systems. These assumptions include the expected rate of investment return, inflation,
wage growth, mortality, and teacher attrition. Retirement funds often discount employees’ future
benefits at the assumed rate of investment return. When the actual investment return rate falls
short of the expected rate, unfunded accrued liabilities will rise (Costrell, 2018). Teacher
pensions are underfunded by approximately $600 billion nationally (McGee, 2019; Novy‐Marx
& Rauh, 2011).
As state and local governments continue to underfund their employees’ public pensions,
they search for ways to manage pension expenditures. To do so, state and local governments may
cut funding away from other programs and redirect those funds to pensions. Pension
expenditures are already cutting into “social services to the elderly, blind, disabled and other
children and adults, and licensing and regulating foster homes, group homes, residential care
facilities, day care facilities, and preschools” (Nation, 2018, p. 17). This crowd-out also creeps
into school funding, as contributions to retirement benefits as a proportion of per pupil funding
rose from 4.8 percent in 2004 to 11 percent in 2019 (Costrell, 2019). Crowd-out is suppressing
teachers’ wages (Kim et al., 2020; McGee, 2016). State and local governments may also try to
increase funding in their pensions by raising employee contributions to the pension funds or by
increasing employer contributions by increasing tax revenues.
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Some state and local governments have even considered inducing teacher turnover as a
potential solution.1 For example, Chicago Public Schools negotiated the Voluntary Retirement
Incentive (VRI) with the Chicago Teachers Union in 2017. This deal was simple: teachers
eligible for retirement would receive a bonus equal to years of service in Chicago Public Schools
times $1,500. For example, a teacher with 30 years of service would receive a lump sum
payment of $45,000.2 The only caveat was that a minimum of 1,500 teachers would have to
accept the offer and retire. Of the approximately 2,700 teachers eligible, 27 percent took the deal,
far below the required minimum for the bonuses to be paid out (Knapp et al., 2019). The problem
with Chicago’s efforts was that there were two competing incentives at play. There was the
“push” out of teaching in the form of a bonus, but there was a “pull” to stay in the classroom in
the form of annual salary and the continued accrual of pension benefits. Knapp et al. (2019)
estimated that approximately 590 total teachers would have taken the deal but that 430 would
have retired regardless of the VRI. The remaining 160 were induced to retire as a result of the
VRI.3 These findings suggest that inducing enough teacher turnover to rein in costs may be a
challenge. Accruing benefits and salary likely represented too large of a pecuniary hump to
induce retirement for non-VRI takers.
While unevaluated, both Kansas and California have offered or are currently offering
similar programs. Kansas offered a VRI in Fall 2011 where retirement eligible public employees
in its Tier 1 or Tier 2 final average salary plans would be allowed to remain in the state’s group

Policies designed to create teacher turnover not only prevent pension benefits from accruing as teachers exit the
profession but can generate additional savings since highly experienced teachers also earn some of the highest
salaries.
2 An entering teacher with a bachelor’s degree earned $50,653 in the 2014-2015 school year (Dabrowski &
Klingner, 2016). This means that the teacher with 30 years of experience would actually receive a VRI bonus that is
less than the example entry level teacher’s salary.
3 The projection in Knapp et al. (2019) turned out to be incorrect. They expected 22 percent of teachers to take the
VRI when 27 percent actually did. Assuming that the researchers were able to correctly calculate the number of
teachers who would have retired regardless, their estimate of the induced teachers would represent a lower bound.
1
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health insurance plan or receive a single payment of $6,500 (Kansas Department of
Administration, n.d.).4 California’s ongoing program offers retirement eligible teachers two years
of additional service credit, which would result in more generous retirement benefits for teachers
accepting the incentive (CalSTRS, n.d.).
This paper conceptually evaluates policies like voluntary retirement incentive programs.
Using Massachusetts as a model, I consider how changing teacher exit rates could offset rising
normal costs when lowering the discount rate. The normal cost is the amount of money required
to prefund all currently accruing benefits in a year. I construct the uniform normal cost rate, a
weighted average of the cost to prefund individual teachers’ accruing pension benefits as a
percent of salary, based on the actuarially assumed discount rate. The assumed discount rate is
the expected rate of investment return. Using this assumed rate, the pension fund will be able pay
all retirement benefits if total contributions to the fund are equal to the uniform normal cost rate.
Since teacher retirement systems discount at an overestimated rate of investment return, changes
in the discount rate would require changes in other pension assumptions if the uniform normal
cost rate is expected to hold constant.
I vary the assumed teacher attrition rates using additive deviations for all teachers in
Massachusetts to make up for the difference in rising normal costs resulting from changes in the
discount rate. In essence, if Massachusetts were to continue funding at the uniform normal cost
rate and discount at the assumed rate of investment return, it would need to raise teacher attrition
rates by these deviations. I also model two plausible policies that would increase teacher attrition
rates for teachers earning individual normal cost rates above the uniform rate and teachers who
are at the retirement age.

The state of Kansas only pays the employer share of the group health insurance plan’s premiums for employees
choosing to retire and continue to be covered by the group health insurance plan.
4
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The uniform normal cost rate under a discount rate of 7.5 percent is 11.87 percent of
salary. My results show, as would be expected, that lower discount rates require larger deviations
to assumed teacher exit rates to hold the normal cost constant. I also find that the two plausible
policies that target subsets of the teaching population would have to force every teacher that
satisfies the inclusion restrictions to exit, but these targeted exit strategies would be unable to
cover the entirety of the rise in the uniform normal cost rate resulting from lowering the discount
rate. Generally, I find that the necessary turnover rates would be unrealistic or would not cover
all currently accruing costs.
The rest of this paper is organized into four sections. The next section describes the
Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System and lays out the normal cost rate methodology. The
following section describes how I model the teacher population in Massachusetts. The next
explains how I will deviate exit rates from the actuarially assumed teacher exit rates and shows
the impacts of increasing teacher exit rates in Massachusetts. The final section concludes with a
discussion of the strategies to induce teacher attrition, other unintended consequences of these
policies, limitations, and policy implications.
The Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement Systems and Normal Cost Rates
In this paper, I use the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System as a model (MTRS).
MTRS assumes that all teachers exit by age 70, thus I consider all entry ages 𝑒 = 21, … ,60 and
all exit ages 𝑠 = 21, … ,70. I use four data sources on MTRS to calculate normal cost rates in
Massachusetts from MTRS and the Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration
Commission (PERAC). I use the actuarial assumptions for the discount rate/investment return,
interest on refunds for non-vested members, cost of living adjustments, mortality, wage growth,
and entry age cohort sizes from the 2016 MTRS actuarial valuation report (Massachusetts Public
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Employee Retirement Administration Commission, 2016). I use the 2014 MTRS experience
study (Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, 2014) for
female turnover rates. I obtain the interest on refunds for vested members from the 2016
financial condition statement (Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System, 2016). Finally, the
2017 benefit guide (Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System, 2017) provides the benefit
formulas.
MTRS assumes investment returns equal to 7.5 percent and discounts at this rate
(Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, 2016). Costrell and
McGee (2019) define the present value of an individual’s wages as
𝑤
𝑊𝑒𝑠 = ∑𝑠𝑎=𝑒 (1 + 𝑑)𝑒−𝑎 ∏𝑎𝛼=𝑒(1 + 𝑔𝑒,𝛼−𝑒
).

(1)

𝑤
Here, 𝑔𝑒,𝛼−𝑒
is the assumed wage growth rate including merit and inflationary components from

PERAC (2016). The discount rate is 𝑑 which MTRS assumes to be 7.5 percent.
I model the Massachusetts’ Tier 2 teacher retirement plan (Massachusetts Teachers’
Retirement System, 2017).5 Tier 2 is for all teachers in Massachusetts that entered on or after
April 2, 2012. This plan is a 5-year final average salary defined benefit plan with vesting at 10
years of service. Non-vested members can have their contributions refunded with 3 percent
interest. Vested members can take a refund of contributions grown at a 0.1 percent interest rate
or vested members can opt for a pension. Teachers with fewer than 30 years of service contribute
11 percent of earnings and teachers with 30 or more years of service contribute 8 percent.
Massachusetts uses a 5-year final average salary plan. In this plan, teachers’ initial
benefits are a percent of their average salary over the last 5 years of their careers. This percent of

Massachusetts also has a Tier 1 plan. This plan is a 3-year final average salary with higher service factors and a
retirement age of 55. Modeling only the Tier 2 plan should not bias my results substantially. If there is any bias, my
results would represent lower bounds since using the Tier 1 parameters would likely increase my estimates.
5
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final average salary, sometimes called a “replacement rate,” is the product of teachers’ years of
service in MTRS and a service factor that varies by teachers’ ages and years of service. 6
Through RetirementPlus, teachers with 30 years of overall service and 20 years of service as a
teacher in MTRS can earn larger replacement rates. Replacement rates are capped at 80 percent
of final average salary, even among RetirementPlus eligible teachers. MTRS includes a cost of
living adjustment of 3 percent on the first $13,000 in annual retirement benefits.
I discount the value of refunds and the value of a stream of pension payments back to
entry. Unlike other state retirement systems, MTRS does not provide assumptions for the take-up
rate of pension or refund; accordingly, I assume teachers choose either the refund or pension
based on which one has the higher present value.
Normal Cost Rates
This paper utilizes the normal cost rates from Costrell and McGee (2019) and which
Costrell (2020) and Costrell and Fuchsman (2018) also use. A normal cost rate is the required
contribution to prefund currently accruing pension benefits of an individual member – in this
case, a teacher – in the retirement system. An individual member of the teacher retirement
system is of type (𝑒, 𝑠), where 𝑒 is entry age and 𝑠 is the age at separation (exit). I will refer to a
cohort of teachers of type (𝑒, 𝑠) as entry-exit age cohorts. An individual’s normal cost rate is the
ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of earnings,
𝑛𝑒𝑠 = 𝐵𝑒𝑠 /𝑊𝑒𝑠 ,

(2)

where 𝐵𝑒𝑠 is the present value of benefits and 𝑊𝑒𝑠 is the present value of earnings defined in
equation (1). Both benefits and wages are discounted back to the time of entry in the teaching
workforce.

6

See MTRS (2017) for these replacement rates.
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The proportion of members in the system of type (𝑒, 𝑠) is denoted by 𝑝𝑒𝑠 .7 The uniform
normal cost rate is the weighted average of all individual normal cost rates:
𝑛∗ =

∑𝑒 ∑𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑠 (𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑊𝑒𝑠 )
∑𝑒 ∑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑊𝑒𝑠

.

(3)

This uniform rate represents the proportion of wages required to prefund all currently accruing
benefits in the retirement system. Employees and the employer partition the uniform normal cost
rate in order to pay it. Typically, government statute will set the employee contribution rate and
the employer will pay the portion that is left after netting out employee contributions. If this
uniform normal cost rate is paid in full and assumed investment returns are actualized, then the
unfunded accrued liabilities would not increase. However, even if the uniform normal cost rate is
paid in full, unfunded accrued liabilities will rise if actual investment returns fall short of
assumed returns.
Costrell and McGee (2019) also show that the deviations between an individual’s normal
cost rate and the uniform normal cost rate sum to zero. They term these deviations “crosssubsidies.” Cohorts receive positive and negative cross-subsidies when their normal cost rate is
greater than or less than the uniform normal cost rate. Individuals with positive cross-subsidy are
sometimes referred to as the “winners,” and “losers” are those who receive negative crosssubsidies.
Normal Cost Rates in MTRS
An important result that leads to underfunding of teacher pension is that higher discount
rates correspond with lower normal costs. The underfunding problem can occur when discount
rates are overestimated. Figure 1 plots normal cost rate surfaces corresponding with several

I construct the share of members in a (𝑒, 𝑠) cohort similarly to Costrell and McGee (2019). I summarize that
methodology in the next section.
7
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discount rates including MTRS’ assumed discount rate. It shows the impact that the discount rate
has on the uniform normal cost rate. In this figure, the x-axis is exit ages, the y-axis is entry ages,
and the z-axis is normal cost rates. To the right of the surface plot are the uniform normal cost
rates corresponding to the alternate discount rates. Colors of the mesh surfaces correspond to a
single discount rate with black mesh at the bottom corresponding to the assumed rate of
investment return at 7.5 percent.
I find that, in conjunction with Costrell (2020), as the discount rate is lowered, individual
normal cost rates rise. Each mesh surface in figure 1 has a similar shape. There is significant
heterogeneity in normal cost rates along each mesh surface indicating that normal cost rates vary
significantly by entry and exit ages. For all surfaces other than the red mesh when discounting at
3 percent, the surfaces decline until members vest in MTRS.8 After vesting, the normal cost rates
fall toward zero before increasing as members begin to accrue more generous benefits. All
normal cost rate surfaces decline toward zero as exit ages near 70.
More relevant for this paper than the shape of the normal cost rate surfaces are the
uniform normal cost rates that correspond with the selected discount rates. The actuarially
assumed discount rate is 7.5 percent and accompanies a uniform normal cost rate of 11.87
percent. Reducing the discount rate by half of a percentage point results in an increase of the
uniform normal cost rate to 13.16 percent. The uniform normal cost rate rises to 20.9 percent of
all earnings when the discount rate is 5 percent. When discounting at the interest rate on risk-free
assets, 4 percent, the uniform normal cost rate is 27.02 percent. Under a 3 percent discount rate,
the interest rate on contributions of non-vested members, the uniform normal cost rate is 35.35
percent.

The red mesh surface denoting normal cost rates under a 3 percent discount rate is flat 11 percent, the employee
contribution rate, since this discount rate is also the interest rate on refunds for non-vested members.
8
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Teacher Population in Massachusetts
I adapt methodology from Costrell and McGee (2019) to model the current teacher
population in Massachusetts probabilistically. They calculate the share of total members in an
(𝑒, 𝑠) of the member population by multiplying the conditional probability of exit at age 𝑠 given
entry at 𝑒 by the probability of entry at age 𝑒,
𝑝𝑒𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠|𝑒 ∗ 𝑝𝑒 .

(4)

The probability of exit at age 𝑠 given entry at 𝑒 can be obtained using MTRS assumptions
regarding mortality and turnover. I define the probability still working at age 𝑠 for an entrant at
age 𝑒 using three components: the probability that the member was still working the prior year,
the probability that the member did not exit after the prior year, and the probability that the
individual did not die in the current year. Formally, the probability a member is still working at
age 𝑠 given entry at age 𝑒 is:
𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑤
𝑝𝑠|𝑒
= 𝑝𝑠−1|𝑒
∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑒,𝑠−1 ) ∗ (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠 )

(5)

where the probability still working at entry is equal to one, 𝜏𝑒,𝑠−1 is the assumed exit rate, and
𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠 is the mortality rate. Subtracting the probability still working the previous year from the
probability still working in the current year yields the exit hazard for this year:
𝑠𝑤
𝑠𝑤
𝑝𝑠|𝑒 = 𝑝𝑠|𝑒
− 𝑝𝑠−1|𝑒
.

(6)

Costrell and McGee (2019) are able to calculate the share of members entering at age 𝑒,
𝑝𝑒 , using data the California State Teachers’ Retirement Systems provides, but MTRS does not
provide this data. In order to derive the probability of entering MTRS at age 𝑒, I use a three-step
procedure. MTRS provides the number of members within an age range and years of service
range (Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, 2016). For
example, there are 2,177 members in MTRS between ages 0 and 24 with 0 and 4 years of service
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and 1,575 members between ages 25 and 29 with 5 and 9 years of service. I focus on those
between 0 and 4 years of service between ages 22 and 59. The lower bounds on the age ranges,
𝐿𝑖 , can be found in the first column of appendix table 1.1. The upper bounds on the age ranges,
𝑈𝑖 , can be found in the second column of this table.
The first step in my procedure is to determine a simple average number of entrants within
each age range bin. The number of entrants between ages 𝐿𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 is:
𝑈

𝑃𝐿𝑖 ,𝑈𝑖 =

𝑈
∑ 𝑖 𝑝𝑠𝑤 ∗1(𝑠−𝑒<5)
𝑖−1 𝑠=𝐿𝑖 𝑠|𝑒
𝑈𝑖
𝑈
∑𝑒=𝐿
∑ 𝑖 𝑝𝑠𝑤
𝑖 𝑠=𝐿𝑖 𝑠|𝑒

𝑖−1
𝑁𝐿𝑖 ,𝑈𝑖 −𝑃𝐿𝑖−1 ,𝑈𝑖−1 ∑𝑒=𝐿

.

(7)

Equation (7) contains three key components. First, 𝑁𝐿𝑖 ,𝑈𝑖 is the number of members within the
age range defined by the bounds 𝐿𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 with between 0 and 4 years of service. The number of
entrants can be found in the third column of appendix table 1.1. Second, the number of entrants
still in the retirement system that entered between the previous cell’s bounds, 𝐿𝑖−1 and 𝑈𝑖−1 , that
would be included in the current cell. For example, the cohort of 23 year old entrants with
between 0 and 4 years of service would be included in the number of members between ages 22
and 24, 𝑁22,24, as well as the number of members between ages 25 and 29, 𝑁25,29. I subtract the
number of entrants for the previous cell that would still be in the system from the total members
within the current cell. The indicator function embedded in the numerator’s double summation
ensures that I only subtract off the members with less than 4 years of service. For ages 22 to 25,
𝑃𝐿𝑖−1,𝑈𝑖−1 is zero. The third key component of equation (7) is the denominator, where I sum up
the probability still working for all those members. The estimated number of entrants can be
found in the final column of appendix table 1.1. I divide each 𝑃𝐿𝑖 ,𝑈𝑖 by the total number of
members between ages 22 and 59 for an initial estimate of the probability of entry, 𝑝𝑒1.
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The second step in my procedure is to weight the initial probability of entry estimates in a
five-year rolling average for ages 21 through 60:
1
1
1
1
𝑝𝑒2 = 0.1 ∗ 𝑝𝑒−2
+ 0.2 ∗ 𝑝𝑒−1
+ 0.4 ∗ 𝑝𝑒1 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑝𝑒+1
+ 0.1 ∗ 𝑝𝑒+2
.

(8)

Summing up the probability of entering at age 𝑒 for all entry ages should be one. However, the
sum of all 𝑝𝑒2s is less than one since my rolling average for ages near the bounds includes
probabilities of entering equal to zero. For example, my procedure omitted entry ages 20 and 21
in step one as I would not expect many entrants at these ages, if any at all. The rolling average
1
1
for age 22 would include zero for both 𝑝20
and 𝑝21
, which makes the sum of the weights for age

22 less than one. In the final step of my procedure, I normalize 𝑝𝑒2 by dividing by the sum of the
probability of entering at age 𝑒 for all entry ages to get the probability of entering at age 𝑒.
Assumed Teacher Exit Rates
Figure 2 plots the survival rates of an entering cohort for all entry ages based on the 2016
MTRS assumptions regarding mortality and turnover. I use the number of beginning teachers in
the system and the probability that a teacher is still working at age 𝑠 given entry at age 𝑒 from
equation (5) to construct this stair-step graph. I sum the number of teachers surviving in the
system for each year potential year of service and divide by the number of beginning teachers.
The horizontal axis shows years of service and the proportion of teachers remaining in the
system is on the vertical axis.
The majority of assumed teacher turnover in Massachusetts occurs prior to when teacher
would vest. After one year of service, slightly more than 10 percent of teachers will have exited
the system. The assumed 5-year survival rate in the profession is just below 60 percent. Half of
the entry cohort will exit prior to their 8th year of service. Approximately 46 percent of teachers
will remain in the system long enough to vest in the plan at 10 years of service. Only 25 percent
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will survive to 25 years of service. Ten percent will remain at 36 years of service. By the 40 th
year of service, nearly 98 percent of the cohort will have left.
Deviations from Assumed Teacher Exit Rates
Based on figure 1, I conclude that overestimating the discount rate results in uniform
normal cost rates that are less than the true uniform normal cost rate, which likely ends in rising
pension costs. As state and local governments have come to terms with this result, they seek out
solutions to bring down their pension costs as well as cut costs for other services (Kim et al.,
2020; McGee, 2016; Nation, 2018). I evaluate potential policies similar to those tried by
Chicago, Kansas, and California that aim to induce teacher turnover. Here, I describe a
methodology and apply the methodology to study the impacts inducing teacher turnover. My
goal is to prevent the rise in the uniform normal cost rate that results from lowering the discount
rate by increasing teacher exit rates.
Deviation Methodology
Equation (3) provides a shortened expression of the full uniform normal cost rate.
Expansion of equation (3) would require a full understanding of how to determine retirement
benefits in a system, which can be complicated. It is helpful to think of equation (3) as a function
of its assumed inputs rather than the expressions for benefits and wages,
𝑛 ∗ = 𝑛(𝑑, 𝝉𝑒𝑠 ).

(9)

Here, the discount rate is 𝑑 and the teacher exit rates are 𝝉𝑒𝑠 which denote the probability that an
individual entering at 𝑒 exits at 𝑠.9 While many other assumptions are required in order to

I describe individuals as being of type (𝑒, 𝑠) throughout as those who enter at age 𝑒 and exit at age 𝑠. The normal
cost rate for an individual of this type has been 𝑛𝑒𝑠 . I use similar notation when describing probabilities (i.e., 𝑝𝑒𝑠 is
the probability that a member is of type (𝑒, 𝑠)). Teacher exit rates are considered to be the probability that teachers
will exit, 𝜏𝑒𝑠 .
99
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calculate 𝑛 ∗ , the two key assumptions under evaluation in this paper are the discount rate and
teacher exit rates.
Let 𝑛𝑑∗ 0 be the uniform normal cost rate obtained when the discount rate is the actuarially
assumed rate of investment returns and when using assumed teacher exit rates. As Costrell
(2020) shows and I show previously in this paper, lowering the discount rate, corresponds with a
new uniform normal cost rate exceeding 𝑛𝑑∗ 0 . If actual investment returns are truly lower than the
discount rate, the retirement system is underfunded at 𝑛𝑑∗ 0 and contributions would need to rise.
In order to continue funding at this uniform rate, some other assumed parameter in equation (9)
must change. In this paper, I study the possibility of how to alter the assumed exit rates when
actual investment returns are lower than assumed,
𝑛𝑑∗ 0 = 𝑛(𝑑1 , 𝑔(𝝉𝑒𝑠 , 𝜿𝑒𝑠 )) .

(10)

Here, the discount rate 𝑑1 is lower than the actuarially assumed 𝑑0 and 𝑔(⋅) is some function that
deviates the assumed exit rates by a factor 𝜿𝑒𝑠 . Identifying a set of deviation parameters, 𝜿𝑒𝑠 is
impossible in equation (10) since it is underdetermined: there is only one equation and 1,220
unknowns.10
I make two simplifying assumptions to regarding equation (10). I reduce the number of
unknown deviation parameters to only one and make it an additive deviation. The uniform
additive deviation is used for all teachers and then for subsets of teachers in later analyses. Exit
rates are allowed to change for teachers with positive cross-subsidies and teachers that are
eligible for retirement. Deviations are approximated with numerical methods to be within one
millionth of the uniform normal cost rate under the assumed 7.5 percent discount rate.

Plausible exit ages are those that are greater than or equal to the entry age. Then, for the entry and exit ages under
70
investigation, the number of potential exit ages is ∑60
𝑒=21 ∑𝑠=21 1(𝑠 ≥ 𝑒) = 1,220.
10
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An additional benefit of using additive deviations is their ease in interpretation. Additive
deviations represent the percentage point change in a teacher’s exit probability. For example, if
the additive deviation is 2 percentage points and a teacher’s exit probability is 10 percent, the
new exit probability is 12 percent.
Uniform Deviations
Figure 3 plots estimated survival rates that would be needed to maintain uniform normal
costs for different discount rates and using a single additive deviation for all teachers. Each
survival rate corresponds with altered exit rates; the deviation is added to the exit rates that
MTRS actuaries assume. The uniform normal cost rate for these exit rates is the uniform normal
cost rate from estimation with a discount rate of 7.5 percent. Since exit rates can be expressed as
a percentage, the additive deviations can be interpreted as a percentage point increase in the
proportion of exiting teachers when all else is held constant.
As I expect, lower discount rates require higher deviations to maintain the uniform
normal cost rate. As a result, the survival function for the lowest discount rate is always
associated with higher attrition for each year of service until the survival rates converge at zero.
Overall, the proportion of teachers that would be needed to exit the first year varies between 11
percent (or 89 percent retained) under the assumed 7.5 percent discount rate and 39 percent (61
percent retained) in the 3 percent discount rate case. The 5-year attrition rate is between 40 and
90 percent. Both survival rate functions for the 3 and 4 percent discount rates converge at zero
within 22 years of service; no teacher would stay in the profession long enough to collect large
benefits. Convergence of all survival rates occurs within 45 years of service.
The additive deviation for the 7 percent discount rate required to hold the uniform normal
cost rate constant at 11.87 percent is 2.3 percentage points. Taking a 10 percent assumed attrition
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rate as an example, to make up for discounting at the assumed rate of investment return when it
is underestimated by half of a percentage point would require a 12.3 percent attrition rate. Under
a 7 percent discount rate and an additive deviation of 2.3 percentage points, the 5-year survival
rate is 53 percent. This rate is significantly lower than the assumed 5-year survival rate of 60
percent. Half of all entering teachers will have left by year 6 rather than by their 8th year.
Approximately 40 percent of teachers would vest in MTRS and 9 percent would remain long
enough to qualify for RetirementPlus. In the assumed case, 19 percent of teachers would have
stayed 30 years and qualified for RetirementPlus.
Lowering the discount rate by another percentage point to 6 percent increases the additive
deviation to 7.2 percentage points. The proportion surviving the first year is 82 percent. The 6
percent discount rate is the first discount rate for which less than half of teachers are expected to
survive at least five years with less than half making it through year 4. By the fifth year, the
surviving population is 39 percent of the starting cohort. For reference, 39 percent of the starting
cohort would have survived to year 14 under the 7.5 percent discount with no deviation. A fifth
of teachers would vest and under 2 percent would reach RetirementPlus eligibility. Less than 10
percent of teachers would remain by their 17th year of service.
The first instance in which the additive deviation is larger than 10 percentage points
occurs when the discount rate falls to 5 percent; the additive deviation is 13.2 percentage points.
Nearly a quarter of teachers would exit after their first year. Less than half the entering cohort
will survive to year 3 and the 5-year survival rate is approximately 27 percent. In contrast, 27
percent of the starting cohort was assumed to survive 23 years under the 7.5 percent discount.
Less than 1 percent of teachers will remain to see their 23rd year of service and 0.22 percent will
survive to 30 years and RetirementPlus.
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The additive deviations accompanying the 3 and 4 percent discount rates are 27.7 and
20.8 percentage points, respectively. For both discount rates, the less than half of teachers will
make it through their second year. The 5-year attrition rate for a 3 percent discount rate is 90
percent and the five-year attrition rate for a 4 percent discount rate is 84 percent. Discounting at
3 percent is associated with only 1.27 percent of teachers surviving long enough to vest in
MTRS. The 30-year survival rate is essentially zero under both discount rates. For these risk-free
discount rates, the required increases in teacher turnover are unlikely to be realistic if schools are
to continue operation.
Targeted Deviations
Adjusting exit rates for all teachers uniformly from assumed exit rates is unlikely to be a
strategy that state and district retirement systems choose to employ. Rather, in an attempt to
offset rising pension costs, retirement systems would be more selective in electing which
teachers should exit. Chicago, Kansas, and California chose targeted strategies with their
voluntary retirement incentive programs. I model two plausible choices for which teachers are
chosen for potential exit: those teachers earning positive cross-subsidies and teachers that are
eligible for retirement. The latter is more in line with voluntary retirement incentive programs in
Chicago, Kansas, and California.
Teachers with Positive Cross-Subsidies.
The first targeted policy I explore alters teacher turnover rates for teachers that earn
positive cross-subsidies when discounting at 7.5 percent. Figure 4 displays which entry-exit age
cohorts receive positive cross-subsidies using the actuarially assumed discount rate. The
magnitudes of normal cost rates can be determined based on the color bar to the right of the plot.
Entry ages can be found on the vertical axis and exit ages are on the horizontal axis. The focal
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point of this graph is the intersection of the vertical and horizontal lines. White intersections
indicate that teachers in the corresponding entry-exit age cohort can be considered winners;
teachers in these cohorts are targeted for increased exit rates relative to their assumed exit rates.
Black intersections indicate that corresponding teachers earn individual normal cost rates less
than the uniform normal cost rate. The size of the cross-subsidies is variable with the largest
cross-subsidies occurring for those entering at age 50 or later. I do not vary the new exit rates
based on the size of the cross-subsidy.
Since winners are identified under the assumed 7.5 percent discount rate, it is possible for
there to not be enough teachers that would exit to make up for the potential rise in the uniform
normal cost rate. This can occur because the distribution of winners and losers changes with a
decrease in the discount rate and a constant uniform normal cost rate. As shown in figure 1,
normal cost rates rise when the discount rate is lowered, which means that more teachers can be
considered winners when funding the pension at the uniform normal cost rate associated with the
assumed discount rate. In the most extreme case of this paper, the 3 percent discount rate case,
all teachers are winners as soon as they vest in the system when funding at the baseline uniform
normal cost rate. This phenomenon ends up occurring for all discount rates under investigation
less than 7 percent, making it impossible to choose a uniform exit rate deviation for those
teachers earning positive cross-subsidies that would offset the rise in the uniform normal cost
rate. Instead, the sum of the affected entry-exit age cohort’s assumed exit rate and the cohort
specific deviation is one. In other words, lowering the discount rate beyond 7 percent would
require all teachers earning positive cross-subsidies to exit. For the 7 percent discount rate, the
required uniform rise in exit rates is 45.3 percentage points.
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I produce the new exit rates for the “winner” group using additive deviations with the aim
of choosing a uniform exit rate for these teachers that offsets the rise in the uniform normal cost
rate associated with a lowered discount rate. Figure 5 is the stair-step graph akin to figures 2 and
4. The proportion of teachers remaining is on the vertical axis and the horizontal axis maps years
of service. The black line is the assumed exit rates based on MTRS assumptions. The blue and
orange lines represent the new exit rates using additive deviations for all teachers with the same
service record. This blue line is associated with reducing the discount rate from 7.5 percent to 7
and the orange line is for any discount rate less than 7 percent.
There are two points on figure 5 where the new exit rates diverge from the assumed exit
rates. The first disconnect occurs at 10 years of service. Since the normal cost rate associated
with a refund of contributions is never greater than the uniform normal cost rate, the two survival
rate lines are the same for the 10-year vesting period. At the 10th year of service (i.e. at vesting),
the assumed teacher retention rate is 45 percent, but this declines to 43 percent for the 7 percent
discount rate and 40 percent if all winners exit (discount rates less than 7 percent). Entrants at
age 46 or older immediately earn normal cost rates greater than the uniform normal cost rate as
soon as they qualify for retirement benefits at 10 years of service. Following this first mass
exodus, the two deviated teacher retention rates connect. The altered rates nearly converge with
the assumed rates prior to 30 years of service. In the assumed case, a quarter of teachers will
remain prior to accumulating 25 years of service compared to 23 years of service when exit rates
increase by 45 percent and when all members earning positive cross-subsidies exit.
The second divergence between the three lines in figure 5 occurs at 30 years of service,
when members become eligible for RetirementPlus. Teachers that enter between ages 28 and 31
first earn retirement benefits exceeding the uniform normal cost rate at this 30-year mark. The
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assumed retention rate at 30 years of service is 19 percent but this rate declines to slightly over
15 percent when the discount rates is lowered to 7 percent. The 30-year exit rate is 12 percent
when all winners are forced to exit. To make up for a half point reduction in the discount rate,
less than 10 percent of teachers would remain 32 years into their career and less than 1 percent
would by year 38. When all winners turn over, less than 10 percent of teachers would still be in
the system by 31 years of service and less than 1 percent would survive through their 37 th year of
service.
When choosing a discount rate of 6 percent or lower, the uniform normal cost rate will
have to rise since it is impossible to hold the uniform normal cost rate constant even when all
teachers earning positive cross-subsidies exit. The question then becomes how much of the
potential rise in the uniform normal cost rate can be offset. Table 1 provides the discount rates,
additive deviations, new uniform normal cost rates, and the differences between the uniform
normal cost rate calculated using a 7.5 percent discount rate and the uniform normal cost rate for
all other discount rates when taking the new exit rates into account.
Panel A of table 1 contains the differences in uniform normal cost rates when the targeted
policy is for teachers earning positive cross-subsidies. As shown in figure 5, discounting at 7
percent requires a 0.45 additive deviation to hold the uniform normal cost rate constant; the
difference between uniform normal cost rates is essentially zero. The minimum possible uniform
normal cost rate is 13.62 percent when the discount rate is 6 percent. Relative to the assumed
uniform normal cost rate of 11.87 percent, the difference is 1.75 percentage points. In other
words, current employee and employer contribution rates that total 11.87 percent of salary leave
an unfunded 1.75 percentage points of pay in retirement benefits that have already accrued. This
unfunded portion is much higher when discounting at the relatively risk-free rates of 3 and 4
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percent. The difference in uniform normal cost rates is 18.04 percentage points 10.71 percentage
points for the 3 and 4 percent discount rates, respectively.
Retirement Eligible Teachers.
More in line with programs in Chicago, Kansas, and California would be a targeted
policy that increases exit rates for teachers that are eligible for retirement. Changing exit rates
among retirement eligible members may be a more politically palatable policy tool than the
positive cross-subsidy policy described previously. Forcing or heavily incentivizing exit among
those who are not eligible to receive benefits would leave those leavers without a source of
income whereas those at the retirement age would be able to support themselves using retirement
benefits. It is also usually the case that retirement eligible teachers earn the highest salaries,
which can generate additional savings for the state in terms of compensation that it no longer has
to pay. In Massachusetts, retirement eligibility occurs at age 60 for teachers that have vested in
the system.
Returning to figure 4, teachers in MTRS earn positive cross-subsidies when they become
eligible to collect a retirement benefit with only entry ages 20, 21, and 32 through 34 as
exceptions. However, members entering between ages 23 and 28 become winners two years
prior to the retirement age and several entry ages prior to 50 also become winners prior to the
retirement age. This means that a policy targeting retirement eligible teachers will still allow for
many teachers to earn a positive cross-subsidy.
Figure 6 shows the assumed exit rates in black and the new exit rates based on a targeted
exit policy to remove retirement eligible teachers in blue. The figure only graphs one line with
exit rates deviating from the assumed exit rates since, regardless of the new discount rate, all
teachers at the retirement age would have to exit in an attempt to make up for the rise in the
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uniform normal cost rate that results from lowering the discount rate. 11 The exit rates overlap for
the first 9 years of service since retirement eligibility requires at least 10 years of service. After
10 years, 42.78 percent of teachers would remain and only 16 percent of teachers would reach
RetirementPlus eligibility at 30 years of service. Less than 25 percent of teachers would survive
through their 23rd year and less than 10 percent would make it to year 33. Every teacher would
be forced to exit at 39 years of service.
Since there is only one set of exit rates across the selected discount rates, it is worthwhile
to investigate how much of the rise in the uniform normal cost rate can be offset when forcing all
retirement eligible teachers to exit. Panel B of table 1 includes the uniform normal cost rates
accounting for a lower discount rate and increased exit rates among retirement eligible teachers
and difference between the assumed uniform normal cost rate and these new uniform normal cost
rates. Even when every teacher eligible teacher exits, the uniform normal cost rate rises by 0.23
percentage points when the discount rate is lowered one half point from 7.5 percent to 7 percent.
The difference in uniform normal cost rates swells to 3.23 percentage points when the discount
rate is lowered another point. The relatively risk-free discount rates of 3 and 4 percent
correspond with differences in uniform normal cost rates of 21.19 and 13.17 percentage points.
These differences indicate that employee and employer contributions would still have to at least
double in order to make up for the rise in the uniform normal cost rate.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper conceptually evaluates policies of voluntary retirement incentive programs
similar to those in Chicago, Kansas, and California. These policies sought to induce teacher
turnover in order to generate savings for their retirement systems. I use data from Massachusetts

11

This same result holds if using multiplicative deviations from assumed exit rates.
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to construct the required contributions to pay for an individual’s currently accruing pension
benefits relative to the individual’s wages called normal cost rates. Aggregating individual
normal cost rates for the entire retirement system yields a uniform normal cost rate. Under all
actuarial assumptions, for the case of Massachusetts, I estimate the uniform normal cost rate to
be 11.87 percent of cumulative earnings; the important assumed parameter is a 7.5 percent
discount rate. I approximate a single additive deviation in teacher exit rates for all teachers in the
system as well as for teachers earning individual normal cost rates above the uniform normal
cost rate and teachers eligible to retire. These deviations are intended to be increases in teacher
turnover rates that hold the uniform normal cost rate constant at the rate corresponding with the
assumed 7.5 percent discount rate.
The policies I study vary in their ability to even accomplish the underlying goal of
holding the uniform normal cost rate constant when the discount rate falls. The first policy that
would increase exit rates for all teachers uniformly would offset the rise in the uniform normal
cost rate, but targeting teachers earning positive cross-subsidies would only prevent the uniform
normal cost rate from increasing when the discount rate is lowered from 7.5 percent to 7 percent.
It is impossible to cover the increased uniform normal cost rate when lowering the discount rate
below 7 percent if winners are chosen for selective attrition. Likewise, lowering the discount rate
and forcing all retirement eligible teachers to exit is insufficient to cover the increase in the
uniform normal cost rate. For the cases in which attrition cannot cover the rise in the normal cost
rate, the portion of the uniform normal cost rate that is left unaccounted for can be quite sizable.
Discounting at 3 percent accompanied with either targeted policy would necessitate at least a 150
percent increase in employee and employer contributions.
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Moreover, the specific policy instrument designed to force teachers to exit may not be
without cost. One potential policy is to offer teachers that voluntarily exit a bonus similar to
Chicago’s VRI, however, these bonuses would likely have to be substantial to induce the
required amount of exit. Another potential strategy would be to offer retiring teachers a higher
retirement benefit than teachers may have expected, such as in California’s voluntary retirement
incentive program. The problem with this strategy is that it would also raise the uniform normal
cost rate. One potentially promising plan would be similar to Kansas’ program, which offered
retirees continued enrollment in the state’s group health insurance plan. Future research should
study programs that use health insurance as the retirement incentive to see if this strategy would
actually induce requisite turnover. Involuntary attrition is also an option to increase exit rates, but
this is likely to be politically untenable.
The other non-trivial cost associated with increasing the probability that teachers exit is
that additional teacher turnover is undesirable from a student learning perspective. Teachers that
choose to exit or are chosen to exit may not be uniformly distributed across schools and districts.
Teacher turnover is also negatively associated with student achievement (Ronfeldt et al., 2013).
The only consistent predictor of teacher quality is experience and, on average, inexperienced
teachers would replace experienced teachers who are induced to exit (Clotfelter et al., 2007;
Harris & Sass, 2011; Kane et al., 2008; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Wiswall, 2013).
My results rely on two simplifying assumptions to estimate deviations from assumed exit
rates. I constrain the set of deviations to be only one and I assume that all teachers are subject to
this deviation. I relax the second assumption in my analysis for targeted populations. It is likely
possible to estimate a uniform deviation that would hold the uniform normal cost rate constant
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for different populations than the ones I evaluate. However, I selected these two populations
since they would be the populations that states actually try to incentivize to exit.
These results have two important policy implications. First, I frame rising pension costs
as a result of missing investment return assumptions in terms of teacher turnover. The current
teacher retirement debate often frames the rising costs issue in dollar amounts. For example,
despite paying an amortized portion of the unfunded accrued liabilities in 2015, unfunded
accrued liabilities in Massachusetts rose by $1.8 billion in 2016 (Massachusetts Public Employee
Retirement Administration Commission, 2016).12 At least part of this increase is due to a failure
to estimate the normal cost with an appropriate discount rate. My paper reframes these rising
costs as changes in teacher turnover assumptions. In order to prevent the uniform normal cost
rate from rising from 11.87 percent of salary to 27.02 percent when the discount rate is adjusted
from 7.5 percent to 4 percent, each teachers’ exit probability would have to increase by 21
percentage points. Framing the cost in this way may make the pension reform conversation more
accessible for policymakers and school officials.
Second, I show that common policies that would induce teacher turnover for one set of
teachers over another may not make up for all rising normal costs. Neither of the plausible
policies that target subsets of the teaching population that I modeled are able to cover costs when
the discount rate is lower than 7 percent. This leads me to question the utility of similar policies.
If they just lead to increased teacher turnover and do not fully address the underlying
underfunding issue, then it seems advisable to choose other policy prescriptions.

PERAC (2016) notes that the increase in unfunded accrued liabilities was, for the most part, a result of lowering
the discount rate a quarter point in 2016 from 7.75 percent to 7.5 percent.
12
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Figures

Figure 1: Normal Cost Rates, All Discount Rates
Notes: estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions and benefit formula for new hires. The surfaces
show the normal cost rates for teachers, the cost of pre-funding an individuals’ currently
accruing benefits as a percent of salary. Each surface uses a different discount rate. Bar on the
right displays the uniform normal cost rates, the cost of pre-funding all currently accruing
benefits as percent of salary, corresponding with each discount rates.
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Figure 2: Actuarially Assumed Survival Rates
Notes: Estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions. The function displays the proportion of an
entering cohort (for all possible entry ages) remaining based on years of service.
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Figure 3: Survival Rates based on Constant Additive Deviations for All Teachers
Notes: Estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions. The functions display the proportion of an
entering cohort (for all possible entry ages) remaining based on years of service. Differences in
lines reflect different discount rates and different additive deviations from assumed exit rates.
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Figure 4: Entry-Age, Exit-Age Cross-Subsidies
Notes: estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions and benefit formula for new hires. Color of the
intersection between entry ages and exit ages shows if those ages correspond with teachers
earning a positive cross-subsidy. Positive cross-subsidies indicate that teachers’ normal cost
rates, the cost of pre-funding an individuals’ currently accruing benefits as a percent of salary,
exceed than the uniform normal cost rate. Solid white intersections show that teachers earn
positive cross-subsidies. Black intersections show that teachers’ normal cost rates are less than
the uniform normal cost rate. Cell color displays the size of the individual normal cost rate.
Assumes a 7.5 percent discount rate.
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Figure 5: Survival Rates based on Limiting Positive Cross-Subsidies
Notes: Estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions. The functions display the proportion of an
entering cohort (for all possible entry ages) remaining based on years of service. Differences in
lines reflect different discount rates and different additive deviations from assumed exit rates
when teachers earning positive cross-subsidies are selected to leave at higher rates. All teachers
earning positive cross-subsidies exit for the orange 𝑑 < 0.07 line.
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Figure 6: Survival Rates based on Retirement Eligibility
Notes: Estimated using 2016 MTRS assumptions. The functions display the proportion of an
entering cohort (for all possible entry ages) remaining based on years of service. Differences in
lines reflect different discount rates and different additive deviations from assumed exit rates
when teachers eligible for retirement are selected to leave at higher rates. All teachers earning
eligible to retire exit for the blue line.
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Tables
Table 1: Deviations for Targeted Teacher Populations
𝒅

𝜿

𝒏∗𝒅

𝒏∗𝟕.𝟓 − 𝒏𝒅∗

𝒏∗𝟕.𝟓,𝜿

∗
𝒏𝟕.𝟓
− 𝒏∗𝟕.𝟓,𝜿

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

11.87%
7.5%
Panel A: Positive Cross-Subsidies
13.16%
-1.29
7%
45.29
11.87%
0
16.43%
-4.56
6%
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
13.62%
-1.75
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
20.90%
-9.03
5%
17.33%
-5.47
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
27.02%
-15.15
4%
22.58%
-10.71
1
−
𝜏
35.35%
-23.48
3%
29.91%
-18.04
𝑒𝑠
Panel B: Retirement Eligible
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
13.16%
-1.29
7%
12.10%
-0.23
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
16.43%
-4.56
6%
15.10%
-3.23
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
20.90%
-9.03
5%
19.25%
-7.38
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
27.02%
-15.15
4%
25.04%
-13.17
1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠
35.35%
-23.48
3%
33.05%
-21.19
Notes: Author’s calculations. The uniform normal cost rate is the weighted average of all normal
cost rates for all individuals in the system. The row with a discount rate of 7.5 percent shows the
actuarially assumed discount rate and the corresponding uniform normal cost rate. The uniform
normal cost rate is defined in equation (3). All deviations are the required additive constants that
correspond with the uniform normal cost rate that is closest to the uniform normal cost rate
obtained under the assumed 7.5 percent discount rate. Differences in column (4) are the
differences between the uniform normal cost rate with a 7.5 percent discount rate and the
uniform normal cost rate estimated under a lower discount rate. Differences in column (6) are the
differences between the uniform normal cost rate with a 7.5 percent discount rate and the
uniform normal cost rate estimated under a lower discount rate and the corresponding deviations.
Deviations are approximated with numerical methods. Deviations equal to 1 − 𝜏𝑒𝑠 signify that
all teachers meeting the selection criteria exit. Panel A selection criterion is if the teacher earns a
positive cross-subsidy. Panel B selection criterion is if the teacher is at or above the retirement
age.
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Appendix A: Total Members and Entrants between ages 22 and 59
Appendix Table 1.1: Total Members and Entrants between ages 22 and 59.
Members with 0-4
Present Ages
Estimated Entrants
Years of Service
𝑁𝐿𝑖 ,𝑈𝑖
𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑈𝑖
𝐿𝑖
𝑈𝑖
388
22
24
2,177
435
25
29
8,318
115
30
34
4,543
103
35
39
2,099
62
40
44
1,564
72
45
49
1,409
31
50
54
933
23
55
59
490
Notes: Present ages are the age range from PERAC (2016). Members with 0-4 Years of Service
are the number of individuals in MTRS between the present ages. Author’s calculations for
estimated entrants using equation (7).
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Chapter 3: Teachers’ Preferences for Retirement: A National Stated Preferences
Experiment1
Introduction
Teacher pensions in the United States are grossly underfunded with unfunded liabilities
exceeding $600 billion, a total that is likely to increase in the coming years as plans use more
conservative assumptions and make less risky investments (McGee, 2019; Novy‐Marx & Rauh,
2011). As a result of these pension funding shortfalls, annual per pupil teacher retirement costs
have nearly tripled since 2004, rising from $544 to $1,473, and now account for 11 percent of the
total per pupil education expenditures (Costrell, 2019a). The soaring costs of pension benefits are
straining education budgets and potentially crowding out other public expenditures including
teachers’ pay (Kim et al., 2020; McGee, 2016; Nation, 2018).
The vast majority of teachers participate in Final Average Salary Defined Benefit (FAS
DB) retirement plans that guarantee retirement benefits at a level determined using years of
service and salary at the end of teachers’ careers. These plans have serious drawbacks for
teachers and states’ fiscal health. While FAS DB plans work well for teachers who work 30
years in a single retirement system (e.g. state), these plans often leave teachers in a retirement
insecure position for much of their careers (Aldeman & Johnson, 2015). Typically embedded
within these plans are strong incentives that are not always aligned with schools’ labor market
needs or teachers’ desire to leave before or work after retirement eligibility (Costrell &
Podgursky, 2009). These FAS DB plans are highly susceptible to underfunding; over 10 percent
of current teachers’ wages are set aside to pay for unfunded liabilities (Backes et al., 2016).2 The

1
2

This paper was coauthored with Josh McGee and Gema Zamarro.
The portion of current teachers’ wages being set aside is likely higher now than it was in 2016.
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mounting disadvantages stemming from FAS DB plans pressure policymakers to address the
retirement problem.
Defined Contribution (DC) and Cash Balance (CB) plans have become more popular as
alternatives to FAS DB plans. DC plans, such as private sector 401(k) plans, rely on an
employee’s and an employer’s contributions to the individual’s retirement account and base
benefits on how much money has accrued in the account. CB plans are a type of DB plan. CB
plans guarantee a minimum return, but CB may exceed the minimum depending on the plan’s
actual return rate. Both DC and CB plans are more fiscally safe for states than FAS DB plans.
Importantly, these FAS DB alternatives can be cost equivalent, given key plan assumptions, for
retirement systems and generate comparable retirement benefits while reducing government cost
uncertainty without exacerbating unfunded liabilities (Costrell, 2019b; Costrell & Podgursky,
2009; McGee & Winters, 2018).
Advocates of FAS DB plans argue that these plans function as recruitment and retention
tools for schools to maintain a high-quality workforce (Boivie, 2011, 2017). However, FAS DB
pension incentives to stay in the profession or to exit may not be aligned with teachers’ true
preferences (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009). In fact, recent theoretical evidence suggests that
teachers might actually prefer alternative retirement plan designs that are less back-loaded and
more current versus deferred compensation (McGee & Winters, 2018). Unfortunately, there is
very little empirical evidence on teachers’ preferences for retirement benefits to date.
For this paper, we designed and administered a 15-minute survey to a nationally
representative sample of teachers from the RAND Corporation’s American Teacher Panel. In
this survey, we designed a discrete choice stated preferences experiment following work by
Maestas et al. (2018) and Mas and Pallais (2017). Respondents were offered two jobs with
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randomly selected salaries and a randomly chosen non-salary job attribute. We then model the
choice between these two hypothetical jobs based on the differences between the two jobs’
attributes and salaries to estimate respondents’ willingness-to-pay for specific job conditions. We
explore potential heterogeneity in preferences based on respondents’ teaching experience,
cognitive ability, and conscientiousness. Both cognitive ability and conscientiousness serve as
proxies for teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018; Hanushek et al., 2018).
This paper seeks to understand teachers’ preferences for retirement and preferences for
other working conditions. Although we are not the first to estimate preferences using survey
methodology (e.g., DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010; Horng, 2009; Johnson et al., 2012; Johnston,
2020; Ladd, 2011; Viano et al., 2019), the literature on teachers’ preferences for retirement is
severely limited; we only identified four studies. Two of these studies observed teachers’
behavior to evaluate their preferences for retirement and found that teachers place a higher value
on their current compensation than future compensation through retirement benefits (Biasi, 2019;
Fitzpatrick, 2015).
Using a survey in Washington State, DeArmond and Goldhaber (2010) find that teachers
prefer DC plans to FAS DB plans and that this preference was larger for teachers with less than
15 years of experience. Their survey question specifies that traditional pensions are DB plans
and provide guaranteed benefits, while DC plans are similar to 401(k) or 403(b) plans and are
more portable. Washington State uses a traditional FAS DB plan as well as a hybrid FAS DB/DC
plan. It is reasonable to expect that early-career teachers may have a preference for the
portability that DC plans afford. However, the preference for DC plans may be due to the fact
that the state already has a DC component in its existing retirement plan, which allows teachers
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to be more familiar with how DC plans operate for teachers compared to traditional FAS DB
plans.
The only other survey work that estimates teachers’ preferences for retirement and relates
to this paper is Johnston (2020). Johnston estimates teachers’ stated preferences and willingnessto-pay in a single school district outside Houston, TX, using a similar discrete choice experiment
to this paper. Teachers in the school district choose between two hypothetical job offers where
several job conditions randomly vary. Johnston’s job conditions include salary, salary growth,
retirement plan type, replacement rate, health insurance, and class size among a variety of other
conditions. He finds that teachers are willing to pay for higher replacement rates, DC plans,
lower health insurance premiums, and smaller class sizes. Less surprisingly, willingness-to-pay
estimates for this Houston-area school district indicate that teachers would be indifferent
between switching to a DC plan from a DB plan and a $900 raise. He does not find that
experience mediates this preference.
Our main results indicate that teachers are willing to pay for a variety of non-salary job
conditions with class size as the only exception. Teachers value FAS DB plans higher than they
value alternative retirement plans. Experience explains some heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay
for alternative retirement plans: early-career teachers are indifferent between FAS DB plans and
either DC or CB plans. Additionally, we find that teachers with higher cognitive ability are
willing to pay more for FAS DB plans. Respondents are willing to accept lower salaries if it
means that they can retire with a benefit that replaces a larger portion of their final salaries or if
they can retire at an earlier age. Willingness-to-pay for a higher annual salary growth rate
exceeds willingness-to-pay for a higher replacement rate and this relationship is mediated by
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cognitive ability. Teachers place large values on their health insurance and on enrollment in
Social Security.
We make four key contributions to the literature. First, we anchor preferences in terms of
changes in salary. Others have asked teachers for preferences in terms of which type of
retirement plan teachers would invest in (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010). Second, we are the
first to estimate teachers’ preferences for CB plans. CB plans are growing in popularity among
the United States with Kansas adopting the nation’s first CB plan for new hires in 2009 (Costrell,
2019b). Third, we use a national sample of teachers rather than a sample limited to one state
(DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010) or locality (Johnston, 2020). Finally, we estimate preferences
for a variety of job conditions. While Biasi (2019) and Fitzpatrick (2015) infer preferences for
deferred and current compensation, they can only do so for a specific policy change. Our design
is more flexible to varying several potential job conditions related to retirement.
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. The next section characterizes our
survey and RAND’s American Teacher Panel. Then we develop our stated preferences
experiment. The following section describes our econometric approach to estimating teachers’
willingness-to-pay for job conditions. The results of our stated preferences experiment are in the
following section. We conclude with implications for policy.
Data
We developed an approximately 15-minute survey focusing on teachers’ knowledge of,
preparation for, and preferences for retirement. We adapted questions from the 2018 Health and
Retirement Study Retirement and Pension Plan module as well as the Retirement and Social
Security module. The following section will go into greater detail regarding our retirement stated
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preferences questions. The survey also included previously validated scales designed to measure
financial literacy, personality, numeracy, and risk preferences.
We collect data from the RAND Corporation’s nationally representative American
Teacher Panel (ATP); survey administration was between February 10 and March 16, 2020. The
ATP includes approximately 29,000 active respondents teaching in public K-12 schools.
Teachers are recruited to the ATP using probabilistic sampling methods. The ATP drew a
random sample of schools and purchased schools’ rosters of teachers from a vendor before
randomly sampling teachers within those schools to invite to participate in the panel (Robbins et
al., 2018). For our study, we invited a total of 9,914 teachers and obtained a response rate of 52
percent. Our sample included both a nationally representative sample of teachers as well as
samples representative of the following seven areas: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, New
York State, New York City, and Texas.
The final sample included 5,193 completed responses surveys. From these, we excluded
respondents from our analytical sample if they reported earning salaries over $200,000, if they
reported birthyears prior to 1935, if they had potential ages when entering the teaching
workforce (age minus total experience) under age 20, or if they reported more experience within
their current state of residence than they reported in total. Our analysis sample was 5,146
respondents. Respondents are compensated for their time at a rate of $1 per minute to complete
the survey for a total of $15.
We use two validated measures for respondent’s cognitive ability and level of
conscientiousness, which are used to proxy for teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018;
Hanushek et al., 2018). To measure teachers’ cognitive ability, we include the 8 item Lipkus
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) and the 5 item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005;
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Toplak et al., 2014). Correct responses are counted to build two measures of cognitive ability,
which we combine using a factor analysis with a varimax (orthogonal) rotation. We retain a
single factor where both measures load equally. To measure how conscientious teachers are, our
survey includes the 44 item Big 5 inventory for personality traits (John et al., 1991).3 Responses
to the Big 5 questions are on a 5-point Likert scale. We average responses to the 9 questions that
capture conscientiousness to generate a single measure.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our analytical sample. Over 75 percent of
respondents are female. White teachers make up 83 percent of the sample while black and
Hispanic teachers each comprise 8 percent of the sample. The average age of our respondents is
44 with a standard deviation of 10 and a half years. The age range of our sample is 24 to 81. On
average, teachers had a total of 15.7 years of experience and 14.8 years of experience within
their current state of residence. Using the average age and average total experience as
benchmarks, the average teacher in our sample would have entered at age 29. Our sample has no
first-year teachers but does have teachers teaching in a new state for the first time. Teachers
average reported salary is approximately $63,000 and a standard deviation of approximately
$22,000. We classify 44 percent of teachers as teaching in elementary schools and 56 percent in
secondary schools. Respondents answered, on average, 4.5 of the 8 Lipkus Numeracy questions
correctly. Respondents fared worse on the Cognitive Reflections Test with the average number
of correct answers at 1.5 out of 5. On the 1 to 5 conscientiousness scale, respondents rated
themselves as quite conscientious with an average value of 4.14. The standard deviation on selfreported conscientiousness is 0.55.

3

The Big 5 inventory has been validated in a number of samples (John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999)

105

Stated Preferences Experiment
We use a discrete choice stated preferences experiment following Maestas et al. (2018)
and Mas and Pallais (2017) to understand teachers’ preferences concerning various job
conditions. Stated preferences experiments, also sometimes called a conjoint analysis, originated
in marketing but have spread to several other fields (Johnston, 2020). Part of the reason for their
growing popularity is their success in predicting actual behavior (for example, see Hainmueller
et al., 2015; Wiswall & Zafar, 2018; Wlömert & Eggers, 2016).
In our experiment, we provide teachers with two hypothetical job offers and ask them to
indicate which job they prefer. Each job has eight conditions: salary, type of retirement plan,
replacement rate4, retirement age, annual salary growth, class size, health insurance coverage,
and Social Security participation 5. For each hypothetical job offer pair, salary and one other
characteristic vary. Respondents are instructed to assume all other job conditions, either
explicitly listed in the job offers or not included, are the same. Within each job condition, we
chose baseline values that are either the midpoint of the potential values or the most common
values that teachers are actually subject to. For example, the baseline value of retirement plan
type is the most common teacher retirement plan: FAS DB. These baseline values make up the
baseline job, which is always one of the two jobs offers and the other job contains the randomly
varied condition.
We created a database of 108,000 hypothetical job offer comparisons for respondents.6
Each respondent is presented and asked to choose between two randomly picked jobs eight

A retiree’s replacement rate is the ratio of the retiree’s benefit to salary. It is the proportion of salary that benefits
“replace.” If a retiree earned $75,000 as a teacher, a 70 percent replacement rate would yield annual benefits of
$52,500 (75,000*0.70).
5 Approximately 60 percent of teachers participate in Social Security (Kan & Aldeman, 2014)
6 We arrived at 108,000 hypothetical job comparisons by multiplying the 8 times a respondent would indicate a job
preference times the 13,500 potential respondents. Since we sample from the database with replacement, we
4

106

times. Job offers presented to respondents are randomly chosen from our database with
replacement, which allows for potential offers to be repeated in the sample. Respondents may be
instructed to choose among the same conditions more than once and may not have to choose
among other job conditions at all.
We use a four-step procedure to construct the hypothetical job offers presented to
respondents by randomizing salary offers and one non-salary job conditions. We start by
randomly generating two salary perturbations from a normal distribution with mean 1 and
standard deviation 0.05. These perturbations are multiplied by the respondents’ reported salaries
to create the salary offers in our hypothetical job scenarios. Next, we randomly choose one of the
seven possible non-salary job conditions where each job condition has the same likelihood of
being selected. Then, we randomly pick one value corresponding with the selected job condition
to vary from the job condition’s baseline value. We then randomly pick whether the baseline job
is offered as Job A or Job B and assign the relevant job condition values and salary perturbations.
In the final step, salaries are assigned to teachers to prevent strictly dominating job offers. We
assume that teachers would always select a job that corresponds with a higher salary and a larger
replacement rate, earlier retirement, higher salary growth, smaller class sizes, or additional health
insurance. For example, we would always expect respondents to choose the job that offers 8
percent annual salary growth and a $50,000 salary instead of the job that offers 5 percent annual
salary growth and a $49,000 salary. Switching the salary offer forces a meaningful comparison
about a respondent’s willingness to pay for the extra 3 percentage points of salary growth. We
have no prior expectation for one value for retirement plan type or for Social Security eligibility
to strictly dominate in the same way that our other job condition values dominate.

increased the number of potential respondents beyond the number of teachers we sent the survey to in order to
reduce the number of repeated hypothetical job comparisons.
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Next, we create a table for the job offers and place the salaries in the corresponding job
columns and fills in the baseline job offer column with the baseline job offer. The randomly
selected job condition is filled in next with the randomly chosen condition value. The rows
corresponding with the randomly selected job condition and salaries are shaded to increase
visibility to respondents about how the job offers are different. Key differing text in the
randomly selected job condition and the salary are bolded. The rest of the table is filled in with
the baseline job offer. Figure 1 is an example of two job offers where both jobs are exactly the
same other than the retirement ages and salaries.
When teachers in the sample do not provide their salary information, we use their state
average teacher salary rounded to the nearest $10,000. State average teacher salaries are also
used when respondents’ reported salaries are under $10,000. If respondents do not indicate
which state they teach in, we use the national average teacher salary instead. If class size is the
job condition randomly selected, we either add or subtract 3 students from the state average
school level class size rounded to the nearest integer.7 Again, the national average school level
class size is imputed if respondents do not indicate which state they teach in. Respondents
leaving our question for the grades they teach blank or who indicate they teach elementary and
secondary grades are assigned the average values corresponding to secondary schools. We obtain
average teacher salaries and average class sizes information from the Digest of Education
Statistics (Snyder et al., 2019).8

We consider elementary teachers to be those who teach grade K-6 and secondary teachers to be those who teach
grades 7-12.
8 State average class sizes for the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, and Rhode Island are not
reported due to a failure of reporting standards to be met. See Table 209.30 of the Digest of Education Statistics for
additional information (Snyder et al., 2019).
7
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Table 2 contains the wording for each job condition, the values corresponding to different
job conditions, and additional notes describing which condition values are the baseline values.
Bolded text in the condition wording column is the same bolded text that appears for
respondents. The frequency that job conditions randomly vary between is in parentheses in the
job condition column. The number of times that each job condition is randomly selected varies
between 5,762 and 6,024. Baseline values for each job condition are noted in the potential values
column. The frequency that each job condition value is displayed is in the fourth column. Within
job condition, there is an approximately uniform distribution of the condition values.
The final column of table 2 shows the probability that respondents choose a job with a
given job condition value. The most substantial threat to the validity of our experimental design
is if respondents always choose jobs with the higher salaries, implying that the range of salary
offers is too large, or that respondents never pick the job with the higher salary, suggesting that
the range of salary offers is too small. The variation in respondents’ choices across condition
values indicates that the salary offers are neither too large nor too small. For job conditions with
ordered condition values, we expect respondents to be more likely to choose jobs with more
favorable condition values.
This choosing pattern is what we observe. Between 73 and 74 percent of respondents
pick the job with a replacement rate within 3 percentage points of the 70 percent baseline value,
while respondents were more hesitant to choose jobs with 60 or 62 percent replacement rates and
much more likely to pick jobs with 78 or 80 percent replacement rates. About 73 of respondents
choose jobs that lowered the retirement age by 3 years from the baseline retirement age at age 60
and 79 percent of respondents chose the job with a retirement age of 55. Respondents, however,
were less likely to choose jobs that had retirement ages above the baseline: less than 60 percent
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of respondents pick jobs with age 67 or 69 retirement ages. Between 62 and 67 percent of
respondents opt for jobs that offered rates of salary growth under the 5 percent baseline value
while between 82 and 86 percent of respondents select job offers with higher salary growth rates.
Only 65 percent of respondents choose jobs with class sizes with three fewer expected pupils and
78 percent are willing to accept jobs with larger class sizes, suggesting that teachers do not value
smaller class sizes very highly relative to salary. Jobs offering health insurance that covered 60
percent of healthcare costs are chosen over jobs that offer plans covering 80 percent of costs 62
percent of the time. 78 percent of respondents select jobs that offer dental and optical coverage
instead of plans that do not offer these additional services. Jobs with retirement plans other than
traditional final average salary defined benefit plans are more likely to be chosen and
respondents prefer jobs without enrollment in Social Security.
Econometric Approach
The raw proportions of respondents choosing specific job conditions, presented above,
gives us an overall idea of which job attributes teachers prefer, but it does not tell us how much
teachers prefer those job attributes. Even though we force respondents to choose jobs at the
expense of higher salaries, the simple proportions mask heterogeneity in the gap between the two
salary offers. We cannot tell if teachers are picking jobs because they value the job conditions or
if they pick because like the salary. Following the approach of Maestas et al. (2018), we estimate
teachers’ willingness-to-pay for the seven job conditions previously described.
We assume that teachers choose between a set of jobs based on a latent utility model
where unobserved utility is a linear and additively separable function of the jobs’ non-salary
conditions and the jobs’ corresponding salary:
′
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽 + 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(1)
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where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is individual 𝑖’s latent utility for job choice 𝑗 in the individual’s job choice set 𝑡.
While teachers may weigh several job offers in job choice set 𝑡, our experiment restricts the set
to only two jobs. Within choice sets, only one job condition and salary vary. Non-salary job
′
conditions are 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
and 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the salary. We use the natural logarithm of salary to facilitate

interpretation of our effects as percent changes and since the salary offers in our experiment are
tied to teachers’ reported salaries and there is substantial heterogeneity in salaries across our
national sample and within states due to salary schedules. We assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an Extreme
Value Type I random variable.
We model the probability that an individual chooses job choice 𝑗 over job choice 𝑘 in
choice set 𝑡 as:
′
′
𝑃(𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 ) = Λ[(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
− 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
)𝛽 + 𝛿(ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ln 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑡 )]

(2)

where Λ[⋅] denotes the cumulative logistic distribution. We should be able to identify 𝛽 and 𝛿 in
equation (2) since each non-salary job condition and salary is randomly selected. Despite our
randomization, there could be other state level unobserved differences that are associated with
the jobs that our respondents select. For example, most states use FAS DB plans, which may lead
teachers to develop a preference for these plans. To account for these differences, we include
state fixed effects. Preferences may also be dynamic based on how many job choices respondents
have already made. For example, respondents may be willing to pay to retire at age 57, but the
strength of that preference may differ if respondents have seen a previous job offer with an age
55 retirement age. To combat this type of bias, we also include question fixed effects in some
models.
Consider a non-salary job condition 𝑐 and the marginal utilities for this job condition, 𝛽𝑐 ,
and salary, 𝛿, identified in equation (2). For individual 𝑖, job offer 𝑗 in choice set 𝑡 that included
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job condition 𝑐 has expected utility 𝐸(𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) = 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 and job offer 𝑘 in the same choice
set that does not have the job condition has expected utility 𝐸(𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 ) = 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑡 . An individual is
indifferent between the two jobs when we fix the salary at 𝑤 and subtract off the individual’s
willingness-to-pay for the job condition:
𝛿 ln 𝑤 = 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛿 ln(𝑤 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 )

(3)

where the 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 is the willingness-to-pay for job condition 𝑐. We solve for 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 in equation
(3) to derive our willingness-to-pay measure:
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 = 𝑤 [1 − exp (−
We report willingness-to-pay estimates as 1 − exp (−
100 [1 − exp (−

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

)].

(4)

) and interpret these effects as

)] percent salary increases. We use the delta method to calculate standard

errors in equation (4) and cluster the standard errors for each respondent. Statistical inference
tests the null hypothesis that the willingness-to-pay estimates are different from zero; under this
null hypothesis, respondents would be indifferent to the job condition.
We investigate heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for job conditions based on
respondents’ experience, cognitive ability, and levels of conscientiousness. Cognitive ability and
conscientiousness serve as proxy measures for teacher quality. To do so, we interact the
differences in job conditions for a choice set with experience, cognitive ability, and
conscientiousness in equation (2). Estimates of 𝛽𝑐 these interaction terms would represent the
differential effect of teachers’ preferences for the job condition for teachers in the top or bottom
quartile for these mediators relative to teachers in the second or third quartiles of the mediators’
distributions. In order to translate this differential into a willingness-to-pay estimate, we add the
interaction term to the reference group’s preference in the numerator of the exponential in
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equation (4). For example, the willingness-to-pay for an early-career teacher, denoted by the
superscript 𝑒, for job condition 𝑐 is 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐𝑒 = 𝑤 [1 − exp (−

𝛽𝑐 +𝛽𝑐𝑒
𝛿

)] where 𝛽𝑐𝑒 is the

differential preference of the job condition for early-career teachers. We interpret this effect
similarly to the overall effect.
Results
Table 3 contains our willingness-to-pay-estimates for the entire sample. These estimates
are estimated using the non-linear transformation in equation (4) based on the estimates from the
model described in equation (2). The first column is our base specification while the second
column includes state fixed effect to control for any residual variation in preferences that could
be correlated with respondents’ state of residence retirement systems options. In column 3, we
include question fixed effects to control for changes in willingness-to-pay as respondents answer
more questions. Finally, column 4 includes both state and question fixed effects.
We prefer the fully specified model in column 4 since we expect heterogeneity across
states and questions. In the absence of state fixed effects, we expect respondents’ willingness-topay estimates to be larger and in favor of the state-offered plan since respondents are more
accustomed to their plans. Willingness-to-pay estimates may be larger for the first stated
preference questions than for the last questions while respondents are getting used to the set up
and understanding the job conditions. The results when including either state or question fixed
effects for plan type, health insurance and Social Security shrink toward zero relative to the
results without either fixed effect, but this shrinkage is slightly larger when including state fixed
effects rather than questions fixed effect. Results that include state fixed effects but exclude
question fixed effects mirror results that account for the effects of states and questions. Overall
results of this analysis indicate that respondents were willing to forgo current salary to remain in
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their DB plans, higher replacement rates, earlier retirement ages, higher salary growth rates,
smaller class sizes, more health insurance benefits, and to be enrolled in Social Security; all
estimates are statistically different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level.
Respondents value their FAS DB plans more than they value alternative retirement plans.
Overall, on average, respondents equate switching from a DB plan to a DC plan with a 3.7
percent pay cut in our base model (column 1) and a 2.8 percent pay cut in our fully specified
model (column 4). This finding differs from previous literature that finds that teachers actually
preferred DC plans to DB plans and were willing to pay for DC plans (DeArmond & Goldhaber,
2010; Johnston, 2020). Our divergence from previous literature could be partially explained by
our sample’s geographic diversity: DeArmond and Goldhaber (2010) use a sample of teachers in
Washington State, which includes a DC component in their hybrid retirement system, while
Johnston (2020) uses a sample of teachers from a single school district in Texas.
Respondents may be marginally more willing to switch to a CB plan from their FAS DB
plan than they were willing to switch to a DC plan. Our results show that switching from an FAS
DB plan to a CB plan is associated with a 3.5 percent decrease in salary in the base model
(column 1) and a 2.6 percent decrease in salary in the fully specified model (column 4), similar
to the results for changing to a DC plan described above. It is worth noting that when
respondents have to pick between an FAS DB plan and an alternative plan, they are instructed
that retirement benefits replace 70 percent of salary and that they can retire with full benefits at
age 60 for both plans; the only differences are how the benefits are set and how risky benefits are
for teachers. This means that respondents valued the way benefits accrue in an FAS DB plan
more than the alternative plans or value the lower risk inherent to FAS DB plans above the
riskier DC or CB plans.
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Our estimates also show that teachers value higher replacement rates and earlier
retirement ages. A one percentage point increase in replacement rate is equivalent to a 1.6
percent increase in salary. Since a one percentage point increase in replacement rate from the
baseline of 70 percent to 71 percent is a 1.4 percent increase, teachers are indifferent between 1.4
percent increase in replacement rate and a 1.6 percent salary increase. Respondents are
indifferent between lowering the retirement age by one year and a 2.5 percent salary increase.
Willingness-to-pay for replacement rate and retirement age changes is not sensitive to the type of
fixed effect that we include.
Teachers and teachers’ unions commonly call on state and local policy makers to increase
salaries and reduce class sizes (e.g., Weingarten, 2019a, 2019b), but there is a natural tradeoff
here. Hiring additional teachers to reduce class sizes leaves less money in the budget to offer
salary raises. We include salary growth rates and class sizes in our experiment to compare the
magnitudes of teachers’ preferences of these job conditions with preferences for retirement plan
attributions and to quantify the tradeoff between salary growth and class sizes from teachers’
perspectives. We estimate that teachers are willing to pay 5.8 percent of salary for a one
percentage point increase in their annual salary growth rate and 0.4 percent of salary to decrease
average class sizes by one student. Willingness-to-pay for a one percentage point increase salary
growth is nearly four times as large as willingness-to-pay for a one percentage point increase
replacement rate, but this preference may be unsurprising for two reasons. First, while both
represent a form of deferred compensation, salary growth is less deferred than replacement rates.
Second, higher salary growth rates also increase final average salary, which allows a lower
replacement rate to replace a higher salary overall.
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Finally, we include two health insurance components and Social Security in our
experiment to compare retirement preferences with other non-salary compensation preferences.
When faced with a health insurance plan that lowers the percent of health costs that insurance
providers will cover from 80 percent to 60 percent, teachers require a 17.4 or 16.5 percent salary
increase. Respondents are indifferent between a 10.1 percent raise in the base model and a health
plan that includes dental and optical coverage. The willingness to pay in our fully specified
model is 10.8 percent of salary. Respondents are also willing to pay 11.8 percent of salary in the
base model and 10.9 in the fully specified model to be enrolled in Social Security. This
willingness-to-pay exceeds the employer contribution to Social Security of 6.2 percent.
Willingness-to-pay Heterogeneity by Experience
We estimate willingness-to-pay distributions for teachers with differing levels of
experience and present the results in table 4. These estimates are from our preferred specification
and include state and question fixed effects. Column 1 shows the estimates for teachers in the
first quartile of experience (less than 9 years), termed early-career teachers. Mid-career teachers
are those teachers in the second and third experience quartiles with between 9 and 21 years of
experience. Column 3 is for late-career teachers, which are the respondents with greater than 21
years of experience. All estimates in the table are transformed coefficients from the same logistic
regression that interacts early- and late-career status with non-salary job components. We find
that experience significantly mediates preferences for retirement plan type and several other job
characteristics
Early- and mid-career teachers are willing to pay less than their more experienced
counterparts for FAS DB plans relative to DC plans. Early-career teachers are indifferent
between DB plans and DC plans and mid-career teachers value DC plans relative to DB plans at
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2 percent of salary while late-career teachers are indifferent at 6.5 percent of salary. The
difference in valuations between early- and late-career teachers is 6 percentage points and the
difference between mid- and late career teachers is 4 percentage points; both of these differences
are statistically significantly different than zero.
When it comes to CB plans, early- and mid-career teachers have weaker preferences for
FAS DB plans over CB plans. Early-career teachers have no preference between CB and FAS
DB plans; their statistically insignificant preference is actually for CB plans over FAS DB plans.
Mid-career teachers are willing to pay 2.4 percent of salary and late-career teachers are willing to
pay 6.4 percent of salary for an FAS DB plan over a CB plan. Just as was the case DC plans,
late-career teachers have significantly stronger preferences than early- and mid-career teachers
for FAS DB plans relative to CB; the early- late-career teacher willingness-to-pay difference is
6.7 percentage points and the mid- late-career teacher willingness-to-pay gap is 4 percentage
points.
Gaps in willingness-to-pay between teachers with different experience are smaller for all
other job characteristics. Early-career teachers have weaker preferences for earlier retirement
ages and health insurance than mid-career teachers. Early-career teachers also display a smaller
willingness-to-pay for earlier retirement ages and health insurance plans that cover larger shares
of costs than late-career teachers. Respondents in the early-career category have 1.1 percentage
point higher willingness-to-pay for a 1 percentage point increase in salary growth than latecareer teachers We find no evidence of heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for replacement rate,
class size, and Social Security.
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Willingness-to-pay Heterogeneity by Teacher Quality Proxy
Table 5 contains the willingness-to-pay estimates when cognitive ability, our proxy
measure for teacher quality, is included as a mediating condition. The estimates in this table
include state and question fixed effects. We group teachers by quartiles in our cognitive ability
factor. Column 1 contains willingness-to-pay estimates for teachers in the first cognitive ability
quartile, column 2 presents estimates for the second and third cognitive ability quartiles, and the
third column has effects for the top quartile. With class size and Social Security as the only
exceptions, cognitive ability significantly mediates our willingness-to-pay estimates.
We find significant heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for retirement that cognitive
ability explains. As cognitive ability increases, teachers’ willingness-to-pay for alternative
retirement plan types decreases. Teachers in the bottom cognitive ability quartile are indifferent
between switching from FAS DB plans to either a DC or CB plan, while teachers in the top
quartile value these plans at a 5.2 or 4.4 percent pay cut, respectively. Teachers displaying higher
levels of cognitive ability are willing to pay for higher replacement rates and earlier retirement
ages more than teachers in lower quartiles.
Cognitive ability also mediates willingness-to-pay for salary growth and health insurance.
The most striking difference among any of these willingness-to-pay estimates is how much
teachers in the top quartile are willing to pay for salary growth relative to teachers in the bottom
cognitive ability quartile. Respondents in the top quartile are willing to pay 8.2 percent of salary
for a one percentage point increase in salary growth whereas teachers in the bottom quartile are
willing to pay 3.6 percent and teachers in the middle two quartiles are willing to pay 5.9 percent.
Bottom quartile respondents are willing to pay less to prevent their health insurance from
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covering a lower percentage of costs relative to respondents in the other three quartiles. Top
quartile respondents value dental and optical coverage less than other respondents.
Table 6 presents estimates of willingness-to-pay mediated by conscientiousness, our
second proxy measure for teacher quality. Again, we include state and question fixed effects.
Column 1 includes estimates for the bottom quartile of self-reported conscientiousness using the
Big 5 inventory. Column 2 includes estimates for the second and third quartiles of
conscientiousness and column 3 is for the top quartile.
We fail to find much evidence of willingness-to-pay heterogeneity related to teachers’
self-reported conscientiousness. Top quartile teachers have marginally stronger preferences for
FAS DB plans relative to CB plans. Bottom quartile teachers also display weaker preferences for
increases in replacement rate and lower retirement ages than teachers in the middle two quartiles,
but there are no differences in willingness-to-pay for replacement rate and retirement age
between bottom and top quartile teachers or between teachers in the middle two quartiles and the
top quartile. Teachers in the top quartile of self-reported conscientiousness have weaker
preferences for salary growth than all other teachers. High-conscientious teachers also have
weaker preferences for class sizes than low-conscientious teachers. Teachers in the middle two
quartiles have a stronger preference for Social Security than teachers in the bottom quartile.
Conclusion
Teacher pensions are dramatically underfunded in the aggregate (McGee, 2019; Novy‐
Marx & Rauh, 2011). In an effort to make up outstanding liabilities, these retirement funds are
taking up larger sums of money than ever before (Costrell, 2019a), which squeezes state and
local budgets (McGee, 2016; Nation, 2018). Even more, the traditional pension plans associated
with underfunding do not work well for all teachers (Aldeman & Johnson, 2015; Backes et al.,
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2016; Costrell & Podgursky, 2009). However, there are promising alternative retirement plans
with fewer of drawbacks, but advocates for the status quo have stymied the progress of these
substitute plans citing teachers’ preferences for traditional final average salary defined benefit
pensions.
This paper investigates teachers’ preferences for retirement. We develop a stated
preferences experiment that asks teachers to choose among jobs that offer different salaries and
different non-salary job conditions. We embed our experiment into a nationally representative
survey of public K-12 school teachers. We find that teachers are indifferent between a 2.8 and
2.6 percent pay cut and switching to an alternative retirement plan. This finding differs from
other literature on teachers’ retirement preferences that finds teachers prefer 401(k)-style plans to
traditional pension, but the extant literature only measures preferences for a single school district
or state (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010; Johnston, 2020). Corroborating previous literature, we
find that early-career teachers place less value on traditional pensions relative to alternative plans
than their more experienced counterparts.
We also show that teachers place sizable values on other job conditions. Teachers are
willing to trade salary today if it means that retirement benefits will be larger or if they can retire
at a younger age. They put even more importance on salary growth than on the size of their
retirement benefits. Teachers are willing to pay for additional health insurance benefits and to be
enrolled in Social Security. Respondents are not willing to pay very much for changes in their
expected class sizes.
While our results are important for policy, there is one key limitation. Teachers stated
preferences on a 15-minute survey may differ from their true or revealed preferences. There is a
literature that finds that stated preferences experiments tend to match revealed preferences in
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other populations (e.g., Hainmueller et al., 2015; Wiswall & Zafar, 2018; Wlömert & Eggers,
2016), but none of this previous literature has tested if teachers’ stated preferences match their
behavior.
The value that teachers are putting on alternative retirement plans is important for policy.
Relative to FAS DB plans, teachers are willing to accept a smaller raise for a cash balance plan
rather than a defined contribution plan, though this difference is not statistically significant.
Teachers are indifferent between switching from a traditional pension plan to one of the
alternatives and a 5 percent raise. The savings to the states if they were to switch to a defined
contribution or cash balance plan would likely dwarf the salary increases. If states find it
politically untenable to switch all current teachers from one retirement plan to another, we show
that early-career teachers place little value on the type of retirement plan they have. States may
be able to reform their retirement systems for all new hires and early-career teachers and receive
less pushback.
Teachers’ willingness-to-pay for other non-retirement plan job conditions is also
noteworthy and generally larger than their willingness-to-pay for retirement plans. Teachers
value 2 percentage point increases in their replacement rates at 3.2 percent of salary, which
exceeds their willingness-to-pay for FAS DB plans over DC plans (2.8 percent) and CB plans
(2.6 percent). Lowering the retirement age one year is associated with a 2.5 percent pay increase,
which is just below the valuation on FAS DB plans relative to CB plans. Teachers value a half
percentage point increase in their annual salary growth rate at 2.8 percent of salary, the same
value that they have for FAS DB plans over DC plans. Teachers are willing to pay approximately
4 times as much for dental and optical insurance or to be enrolled in social security than they are
for a specific retirement plan type. These findings indicate that teachers, while having a
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preference for their retirement plan type, value other components of their compensation
significantly higher.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Female

Mean
0.77

Hispanic

0.08

White

0.83

Black

0.08

Asian

0.03

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Age

44.09

10.49

24

81

Total Experience

15.69

8.4

2

52

Experience in State

14.67

8.14

0

52

63377.28

22473.16

0

Salary

157000

Elementary School

0.44

Secondary School

0.56

Numerical Ability Score

4.48

1.76

0

8

Cognitive Reflection Test Score

1.76

1.53

0

5

Conscientiousness

4.14

0.55

1.78

5
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Table 2: Job Conditions and Values
Job
Condition

Retirement
Plan Type
(5,762)

Condition Wording

The retirement plan
bases benefits on
[value].

Potential Values
a formula involving a person’s age, years of
service, and salary
how much money has accumulated in a person’s
individual account from employee contributions,
employer contributions, and investment returns
employee contributions, employer contributions,
and investment returns with a minimum guarantee
60

Replacement
Rate
(5,850)

Retirement
Age
(5,780)

A teacher who works a
full career in the same
retirement system earns
retirement benefits that
would provide a
monthly check
equivalent to [X]
percent of their end-ofcareer salary.

A teacher who works a
full career in the same
retirement system is
eligible to receive
benefits at age [X].

62
65
67
70

Frequency
Value Appears

Probability of
Choosing Value

baseline
2,881

72%

2,881

70%

779

64%

752
760
767
baseline

64%
71%
73%

73
75
78

661
673
695

74%
79%
85%

80

763

83%

129

55
57
60

992
938
Baseline

79%
73%

63
65
67

970
1,012
963

72%
65%
59%

69

905

52%
129

Table 2 (Cont.)
Job
Condition

Salary
Growth
(5,848)

Class Size
(5,962)

Condition Wording

Salary grows by [X]
percent annually.

Teachers have class
sizes of approximately
[X] students.

Potential Values
2
3.5
5
6.5

Frequency
Value Appears

Probability of
Choosing Value

1,468
1,460
Baseline
1,446

62%
67%

8

1,474

86%

-3
0

2,933
Baseline

65%

+3

3,029

78%

2,961
baseline

62%

2,959

81%

Health
Insurance
(5,920)

The health insurance
plan would cover [X]
percent of healthcare
costs for the average
person and provide [Y].

X = 60, Y = catastrophic coverage
X = 80, Y = catastrophic coverage

Social
Security
(6,024)

Teachers [value] Social
Security.

contribute to and earn benefits in

X = 80, Y = catastrophic coverage, dental, and
optical
do not contribute to or earn benefits in

82%

baseline
6,024

62%

130
130

Table 3: Willingness-to-Pay for Job Conditions
WTP

WTP

WTP

WTP

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Plan Type: DC rather
than DB

-0.037***
(0.004)

-0.028***
(0.004)

-0.030***
(0.004)

-0.028***
(0.004)

Plan Type: CB rather
than DB

-0.035***
(0.004)

-0.026***
(0.004)

-0.028***
(0.004)

-0.026***
(0.004)

Replacement Rate

0.016***
(0.000)

0.016***
(0.000)

0.016***
(0.000)

0.016***
(0.000)

Retirement Age

-0.025***
(0.001)

-0.025***
(0.001)

-0.025***
(0.001)

-0.025***
(0.001)

Salary Growth

0.058***
(0.001)

0.058***
(0.001)

0.058***
(0.001)

0.058***
(0.001)

Class Size

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

Health Insurance: 60%
rather than 80%

-0.174***
(0.005)

-0.165***
(0.005)

-0.166***
(0.005)

-0.165***
(0.005)

Health Insurance: add
in Dental & Optical

0.101***
(0.003)

0.108***
(0.004)

0.107***
(0.004)

0.108***
(0.004)

Do not Enroll in Social
Security

-0.118***
(0.004)

-0.109***
(0.004)

-0.111***
(0.004)

-0.109***
(0.004)

State FE

X

X
X

X
Question FE
41,522
41,490
N
41,522
41,490
Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression
of the model in equation (2). Standard errors calculated using delta method with clustering by
individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Willingness-to-Pay for Job Conditions mediated by Experience
Early-Career

Mid-Career

Late-Career

(1)

(2)

(3)

Plan Type: DC rather
than DB

-0.005
(0.007)

-0.020***
(0.006)

-0.065***
(0.008)

Plan Type: CB rather
than DB

0.003
(0.007)

-0.024***
(0.006)

-0.064***
(0.009)

Replacement Rate

0.016***
(0.001)

0.015***
(0.001)

0.017***
(0.001)

Retirement Age

-0.023***
(0.001)

-0.025***
(0.001)

-0.027***
(0.001)

Salary Growth

0.063***
(0.003)

0.059***
(0.002)

0.052***
(0.002)

Class Size

-0.006***
(0.002)

-0.003**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.002)

Health Insurance:
60% rather than 80%

-0.146***
(0.009)

-0.170***
(0.008)

-0.175***
(0.010)

Health Insurance: add
in Dental & Optical

0.100***
(0.006)

0.115***
(0.005)

0.105***
(0.006)

Do not Enroll in
Social Security

-0.103***
(0.007)

-0.106***
(0.006)

-0.115***
(0.008)

Experience Range

0-8

9-21

22+

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression
of the model in equation (2). N=41,114. State and question fixed effects included. Standard
errors calculated using delta method with clustering by individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Willingness-to-Pay for Job Conditions mediated by Cognitive Ability
Quartile 1

Quartiles 2 & 3

Quartile 4

(1)

(2)

(3)

Plan Type: DC rather
than DB

-0.011
(0.009)

-0.026***
(0.005)

-0.052***
(0.009)

Plan Type: CB rather
than DB

-0.013
(0.009)

-0.023***
(0.006)

-0.044***
(0.009)

Replacement Rate

0.014***
(0.001)

0.016***
(0.001)

0.018***
(0.001)

Retirement Age

-0.020***
(0.001)

-0.026***
(0.001)

-0.025***
(0.001)

Salary Growth

0.036***
(0.002)

0.059***
(0.002)

0.082***
(0.003)

Class Size

-0.006***
(0.002)

-0.003**
(0.001)

-0.005***
(0.002)

Health Insurance:
60% rather than 80%

-0.144***
(0.010)

-0.171***
(0.007)

-0.166***
(0.010)

Health Insurance: add
in Dental & Optical

0.119***
(0.008)

0.111***
(0.005)

0.093***
(0.006)

Do not Enroll in
Social Security

-0.105***
(0.008)

-0.112***
(0.005)

-0.104***
(0.007)

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression
of the model in equation (2). N=41,190. State and question fixed effects included. Respondents
in quartile 1 are low-cognitive ability teachers, quartiles 2 and 3 are moderate-cognitive ability,
quartile 4 is high-cognitive ability. Standard errors calculated using delta method with clustering
by individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Willingness-to-Pay for Job Conditions mediated by Conscientiousness
Quartile 1

Quartiles 2 & 3

Quartile 4

(1)

(2)

(3)

Plan Type: DC rather
than DB

-0.034***
(0.008)

-0.024***
(0.005)

-0.032***
(0.009)

Plan Type: CB rather
than DB

-0.015*
(0.008)

-0.027***
(0.006)

-0.039***
(0.009)

Replacement Rate

0.015***
(0.001)

0.016***
(0.001)

0.016***
(0.001)

Retirement Age

-0.023***
(0.001)

-0.026***
(0.001)

-0.024***
(0.001)

Salary Growth

0.060***
(0.003)

0.060***
(0.002)

0.053***
(0.003)

Class Size

-0.007***
(0.002)

-0.003***
(0.001)

-0.002
(0.002)

Health Insurance:
60% rather than 80%

-0.162***
(0.010)

-0.170***
(0.007)

-0.155***
(0.010)

Health Insurance: add
in Dental & Optical

0.114***
(0.007)

0.106***
(0.005)

0.108***
(0.007)

Do not Enroll in
Social Security

-0.097***
(0.007)

-0.113***
(0.005)

-0.113***
(0.008)

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression
of the model in equation (2). N=41,190. State and question fixed effects included. Respondents
in quartile 1 are low-conscientiousness teachers, quartiles 2 and 3 are moderateconscientiousness, quartile 4 is high-conscientiousness. Standard errors calculated using delta
method with clustering by individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Conclusion
A robust body of evidence recognizes how important high-quality teachers are for
students. High-quality teachers improve student achievement (Aaronson et al., 2007; Hanushek
& Rivkin, 2010; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004), facilitate the development of student noncognitive skills (Jackson, 2018; Kraft, 2017), and significantly improve students’ long-term
outcomes (Chetty et al., 2014). The only persistent predictor of teacher quality is experience
(Clotfelter et al., 2006; Harris & Sass, 2011; Papay & Kraft, 2015; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff,
2004; Wiswall, 2013). Despite positive returns to experience, many teachers do not remain in the
classroom long enough to reach their potential. Raising teacher salaries is one policy prescription
often thought to increase teacher retention (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Imazeki, 2005). However,
expenditures going to teacher pensions have risen drastically (Costrell, 2019), which has
prevented teachers from receiving raises (Kim et al., 2020; McGee, 2016). The substantial rise in
pension expenditures has largely been used to pay down unfunded accrued liabilities (McGee,
2019). This dissertation contributes to the knowledge of teacher turnover and teacher retirement.
In chapter 1, I explore the relationship between voluntary beginning teacher turnover and
teachers’ level of conscientiousness. I construct item non-response rates to proxy for
conscientiousness using beginning teachers’ responses on a long survey taken during their first
year in the profession. A growing literature validates item non-response as a promising proxy
measure for conscientiousness (Soland et al., 2019). Data from the Beginning Teacher
Longitudinal Study reveals that teachers putting forward less effort on their surveys (i.e. less
conscientious teachers) are less likely to leave their schools. I also show that as principal quality
increases, teacher retention increases, but there is important heterogeneity related to the type of
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teachers retained. Higher quality principals are less effective at retaining the teachers that put
forward more effort (are more conscientious) on their surveys.
The results in this chapter are subject to two primary limitations. First, the Beginning
Teacher Longitudinal Study does not include any direct measures of conscientiousness. Item
non-response is only a proxy and as such it is a noisy measure and may be capturing other
aspects of teachers’ work unrelated to their levels of conscientiousness. It could be, for instance,
that teachers who fill out their surveys are highly dissatisfied with their schools and vent their
frustrations on the survey. To alleviate this concern, I construct a measure of teacher job
satisfaction and find that, when controlling for this measure, teachers putting more effort on their
surveys continue to be less likely to stay. Second, my aim is to study voluntary teacher turnover,
which is self-reported on this survey. Teachers that were fired or transferred to another school
against their desires may not want to admit this on a survey. However, conscientiousness is a
skill that is associated with job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick & Zimmerman,
2009; Dalal, 2005; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Roberts et al., 2007), making it unlikely that
conscientious teachers involuntarily exited their schools. If I include any teachers that did not
voluntarily exit their schools, it is likely that these teachers are less conscientious and my
estimates of the relationship between teacher turnover and conscientiousness would be a lower
bound of the true effect.
The second chapter evaluates voluntary retirement incentive programs. It shows that
teachers’ exit rates from the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System would have to
unrealistically increase in order to hold the cost of prefunding retirement benefits, termed the
normal cost, constant when using a lower discount rate than the expected investment return rate.
I consider two targeted policies that would only increase the probability that teachers exit if they
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earn individual normal costs above the average normal cost or if teachers are eligible to retire.
Both targeted policies struggle to accomplish the goal of keeping costs constant when using a
discount rate of 6 percent or less. States would have to raise employee or employer contributions
to make up for this difference. If states do not act, unfunded accrued liabilities will rise. I
conclude this paper with a discussion about policy levers states could pull to increase teacher
turnover and argue that paying out bonuses to retirees, increasing benefits, or allowing retirees to
stay enrolled in the group health insurance plans would be insufficient to generate the required
number of teacher exits.
This chapters’ results are limited since I only model Massachusetts’ Tier 2 retirement
plan. Massachusetts’ Tier 1 plan has slightly different plan parameters; this plan is a 3-year final
average salary plan that gives teachers higher service factors than the 5-year final average salary
Tier 2 plan. The Tier 1 plan has an earlier retirement age than the Tier 2 plan that I modeled. My
decision to focus on the Tier 2 plan should yield a lower bound estimate of the uniform normal
cost rate. Since the Tier 1 plan has a longer averaging period and larger age/service credits than
the Tier 2 plan, the benefits associated with Tier 1 membership will be larger than Tier 2.
Assumed teacher exit rates do not discriminate based on the plan teachers are enrolled in, thus it
is unlikely that the different retirement ages among the two plans would bias my estimate of the
uniform normal cost rate and my results. My estimates of deviations to assumed teacher exit
rates for the targeted policies are at the greatest risk of being biased. Changes to assumed teacher
turnover rates would be larger if the retirement age was the same in both plans, but it is unclear if
more generous benefits in the Tier 1 plan would be offset as these teachers retire earlier and do
not continue to accrue benefits. Further research should test to see how changing the retirement
age affects the size of the deviations I estimate in this chapter.
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Chapter 3 of this dissertation estimates teachers’ willingness-to-pay for different job
amenities. I find that teachers value their FAS DB plans at less than 3 percent of salary relative
to DC or CB plans. Experience and teacher quality (proxied using cognitive ability measures)
mediate this preference for FAS DB plans. Early-career and low-cognitive ability teachers are
indifferent between FAS DB and alternative retirement plans while late-career and highcognitive ability teachers value FAS DB plans. I find teachers have stronger preferences for the
value of their retirement benefit, the age at which they are eligible for retirement, salary growth
rate, health insurance, and Social Security than their employer-offered retirement plan type.
Results from the final chapter of this dissertation are limited since these preferences are
revealed on survey and I lack measures of actual teacher behavior. Observing behavior may
provide better information about teachers’ preferences, but there is a growing literature that
compares stated preferences estimates to respondents’ behavioral estimates. This literature finds
that stated preferences mirror revealed preferences in populations other than teachers
(Hainmueller et al., 2015; Wiswall & Zafar, 2018; Wlömert & Eggers, 2016). Future research
should evaluate how well the revealed preferences of teachers match their stated preferences.
Despite the limitations associated with the three chapters of this dissertation, the results
presented here provide important lessons for policy. Chapter 1 concludes that retention of
conscientious teachers needs to improve and that principals need to develop new strategies to
improve retention of their conscientious teachers. Chapter 2 discourages policymakers from
trying to reduce pension costs by inducing teacher turnover for four reasons. First, the required
amount of teacher turnover would likely be damaging to the successful operation of schools.
Second, increases in teacher turnover are not guaranteed to prevent the rise in unfunded
liabilities. Third, mechanisms to create teacher turnover are unlikely to induce enough teachers
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to leave. Fourth, inducing teacher turnover would prevent teachers from improving in quality
with experience and would force experienced and effective teachers out of the classroom.
Chapter 3 concludes that states would be able to reform their pensions to fiscally safer retirement
plans if they compensate teachers with salary raises. States may choose to exclude experienced
teachers that place sizable valuations on their FAS DB plans when moving teachers out of FAS
DB plans and into new plans.
The results of all three chapters of this dissertation each provide policy implications that,
at the most basic level, ask policymakers to stop and think. It encourages principals to try and
retain effective teachers. It encourages state lawmakers to consider what other costs may be
associated with producing teacher turnover. It encourages state lawmakers to be willing to pay
teachers to enroll in alternative retirement plans. This dissertation also calls on policymakers to
act before it is too late. Failure to act will only make matters worse for teachers and for their
students.
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